skip to content
Neither a borrower nor a lender be : an economic analysis of interest restrictions and usury laws Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Neither a borrower nor a lender be : an economic analysis of interest restrictions and usury laws

Author: Edward L Glaeser; José Alexandre Scheinkman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©1994.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), working paper no. 4954.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : National government publication : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
Abstract: Interest rate restrictions are among the most pervasive forms of economic regulations. This paper explains that these restrictions can be explained as a means of primitive social insurance. Interest rate limits are Pareto improving because agents borrow when they have temporary negative income shocks -- interest rate restrictions transfer wealth to agents who have received those negative shocks and whose  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

 

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Glaeser, Edward L. (Edward Ludwig), 1967-
Neither a borrower nor a lender be.
Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©1994
(OCoLC)31864124
Material Type: Document, Government publication, National government publication, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Edward L Glaeser; José Alexandre Scheinkman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 70048712
Notes: "December 1994."
Reproduction Notes: Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. MiAaHDL
Description: 1 online resource (45, [10] pages) : illustrations.
Details: Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), working paper no. 4954.
Responsibility: Edward L. Glaeser, José A. Scheinkman.

Abstract:

Abstract: Interest rate restrictions are among the most pervasive forms of economic regulations. This paper explains that these restrictions can be explained as a means of primitive social insurance. Interest rate limits are Pareto improving because agents borrow when they have temporary negative income shocks -- interest rate restrictions transfer wealth to agents who have received those negative shocks and whose marginal utility of income is high. We assume that these shocks are not otherwise insurable because of problems related to asymmetric information or the difficulties inherent in writing complex contracts. The model predicts that interest rate restriction will be tighter when income inequality is high (and impermanent) and when growth rates are low. Data from U.S. states' regulations supports a connection between inequality and usury laws. The history of usury laws suggests that this social insurance mechanism is one reason why usury laws persist, but it also suggests that usury laws have had different functions across time (eg. rent-seeking, limiting agency problems within the church, limiting overcommitment of debts, and attacking commerce generally).

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.

Similar Items

Related Subjects:(4)

Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/70048712> # Neither a borrower nor a lender be : an economic analysis of interest restrictions and usury laws
    a schema:Book, schema:CreativeWork, schema:MediaObject ;
   library:oclcnum "70048712" ;
   library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
   library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7600104#Place/cambridge_ma> ; # Cambridge, MA
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/976135> ; # Interest
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7600104#Topic/regulering> ; # Regulering
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1163243> ; # Usury laws
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7600104#Topic/rente> ; # Rente
   schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
   schema:contributor <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7600104#Person/scheinkman_jose_alexandre> ; # José Alexandre Scheinkman
   schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/135446122> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research.
   schema:copyrightYear "1994" ;
   schema:creator <http://viaf.org/viaf/59330025> ; # Edward Ludwig Glaeser
   schema:datePublished "1994" ;
   schema:description "Abstract: Interest rate restrictions are among the most pervasive forms of economic regulations. This paper explains that these restrictions can be explained as a means of primitive social insurance. Interest rate limits are Pareto improving because agents borrow when they have temporary negative income shocks -- interest rate restrictions transfer wealth to agents who have received those negative shocks and whose marginal utility of income is high. We assume that these shocks are not otherwise insurable because of problems related to asymmetric information or the difficulties inherent in writing complex contracts. The model predicts that interest rate restriction will be tighter when income inequality is high (and impermanent) and when growth rates are low. Data from U.S. states' regulations supports a connection between inequality and usury laws. The history of usury laws suggests that this social insurance mechanism is one reason why usury laws persist, but it also suggests that usury laws have had different functions across time (eg. rent-seeking, limiting agency problems within the church, limiting overcommitment of debts, and attacking commerce generally)."@en ;
   schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/7600104> ;
   schema:genre "National government publication"@en ;
   schema:genre "Government publication"@en ;
   schema:inLanguage "en" ;
   schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7600104#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
   schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7600104#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
   schema:isSimilarTo <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31864124> ;
   schema:name "Neither a borrower nor a lender be : an economic analysis of interest restrictions and usury laws"@en ;
   schema:productID "70048712" ;
   schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/70048712#PublicationEvent/cambridge_ma_national_bureau_of_economic_research_1994> ;
   schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7600104#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research
   schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w4954> ;
   schema:url <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/31864124.html> ;
   schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/> ;
   wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/70048712> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7600104#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research
    a bgn:Agent ;
   schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7600104#Person/scheinkman_jose_alexandre> # José Alexandre Scheinkman
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:familyName "Scheinkman" ;
   schema:givenName "José Alexandre" ;
   schema:name "José Alexandre Scheinkman" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7600104#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
   schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/70048712> ; # Neither a borrower nor a lender be : an economic analysis of interest restrictions and usury laws
   schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/7600104#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
   schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/70048712> ; # Neither a borrower nor a lender be : an economic analysis of interest restrictions and usury laws
   schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1163243> # Usury laws
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Usury laws"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/976135> # Interest
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Interest"@en ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/135446122> # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    a schema:Organization ;
   schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research." ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/59330025> # Edward Ludwig Glaeser
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:birthDate "1967" ;
   schema:familyName "Glaeser" ;
   schema:givenName "Edward Ludwig" ;
   schema:givenName "Edward L." ;
   schema:name "Edward Ludwig Glaeser" ;
    .

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31864124>
    a schema:CreativeWork ;
   rdfs:label "Neither a borrower nor a lender be." ;
   schema:description "Print version:" ;
   schema:isSimilarTo <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/70048712> ; # Neither a borrower nor a lender be : an economic analysis of interest restrictions and usury laws
    .

<http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/70048712>
    a genont:InformationResource, genont:ContentTypeGenericResource ;
   schema:about <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/70048712> ; # Neither a borrower nor a lender be : an economic analysis of interest restrictions and usury laws
   schema:dateModified "2017-09-01" ;
   void:inDataset <http://purl.oclc.org/dataset/WorldCat> ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.