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Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy

著者: Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
出版: Melbourne, Vic. : Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, 2002.
シリーズ: Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia working paper, no. 03/02.
エディション/フォーマット:   book_printbook : English
データベース:WorldCat
概要:
Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They
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資料の種類: インターネット資料
ドキュメントの種類: 図書, インターネットリソース
すべての著者/寄与者: Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
OCLC No.: 223392681
物理形態: 26 pages : tables, formulae ; 21 cm.
コンテンツ: 1. Introduction --
2. A model of piracy and give-aways --
3. Piracy and give-aways with a single customer group --
4. Price discrimination between customer groups --
5. No price discrimination --
6. Conclusion.
シリーズタイトル: Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia working paper, no. 03/02.
責任者: Stephen P. King and Ryan Lampe.

概要:

Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They show that piracy can never be profitable if the producer can directly price discriminate between potential pirates and other customers. In the absence of price discrimination, piracy will only raise profits when the ability to pirate is inversely related to customer willingness-to-pay.

Even in this situation, there is no profit maximising equilibrium where some potential pirates buy while others pirate the product. Thus, even though potential pirates differ in their ability to illegally gain the product, the profit maximising outcome involves either no piracy or complete piracy.

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