컨텐츠로 이동
Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy 해당 항목을 미리보기
닫기해당 항목을 미리보기
확인중입니다…

Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy

저자: Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
출판사: Melbourne, Vic. : Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, 2002.
시리즈: Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia working paper, no. 03/02.
판/형식:   도서 : 영어
데이터베이스:WorldCat
요약:
Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They
평가:

(아무런 평가가 없습니다.) 0 리뷰와 함께 - 첫번째로 올려주세요.

주제
다음과 같습니다:

 

온라인으로 문서 찾기

이 항목에 대한 링크

도서관에서 사본 찾기

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; 해당항목을 보유하고 있는 도서관을 찾는 중

상세정보

자료 유형: 인터넷 자료
문서 형식: 책, 인터넷 자원
모든 저자 / 참여자: Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
OCLC 번호: 223392681
설명: 26 p. : tables, formulae ; 21 cm.
내용: 1. Introduction --
2. A model of piracy and give-aways --
3. Piracy and give-aways with a single customer group --
4. Price discrimination between customer groups --
5. No price discrimination --
6. Conclusion.
일련 제목: Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia working paper, no. 03/02.
책임: Stephen P. King and Ryan Lampe.

초록:

Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They show that piracy can never be profitable if the producer can directly price discriminate between potential pirates and other customers. In the absence of price discrimination, piracy will only raise profits when the ability to pirate is inversely related to customer willingness-to-pay.

Even in this situation, there is no profit maximising equilibrium where some potential pirates buy while others pirate the product. Thus, even though potential pirates differ in their ability to illegally gain the product, the profit maximising outcome involves either no piracy or complete piracy.

리뷰

사용자-기여 리뷰
GoodReads 리뷰 가져오는 중…
DOGObooks 리뷰를 가지고 오는 중…

태그

첫번째 되기

유사 항목

요청하신 것을 확인하기

이 항목을 이미 요청하셨을 수도 있습니다. 만약 이 요청을 계속해서 진행하시려면 Ok을 선택하세요.

링크된 데이터


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/223392681>
library:oclcnum"223392681"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
rdf:typeschema:MediaObject
rdf:typeschema:Book
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
<http://viaf.org/viaf/262286909>
rdf:typeschema:Organization
schema:name"Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia."
schema:creator
schema:datePublished"2002"
schema:description"1. Introduction -- 2. A model of piracy and give-aways -- 3. Piracy and give-aways with a single customer group -- 4. Price discrimination between customer groups -- 5. No price discrimination -- 6. Conclusion."@en
schema:description"Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They show that piracy can never be profitable if the producer can directly price discriminate between potential pirates and other customers. In the absence of price discrimination, piracy will only raise profits when the ability to pirate is inversely related to customer willingness-to-pay."@en
schema:description"Even in this situation, there is no profit maximising equilibrium where some potential pirates buy while others pirate the product. Thus, even though potential pirates differ in their ability to illegally gain the product, the profit maximising outcome involves either no piracy or complete piracy."@en
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/134459840>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:isPartOf
<http://worldcat.org/issn/1447-2317>
rdf:typeschema:Series
schema:hasPart<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/223392681>
schema:issn"1447-2317"
schema:name"Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia. Working Paper series,"
schema:name"Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy"@en
schema:numberOfPages"26"
schema:publication
schema:publisher
wdrs:describedby

Content-negotiable representations

윈도우 닫기

WorldCat에 로그인 하십시오 

계정이 없으세요? 아주 간단한 절차를 통하여 무료 계정을 만드실 수 있습니다.