doorgaan naar inhoud
Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy Voorbeeldweergave van dit item
SluitenVoorbeeldweergave van dit item
Bezig met controle...

Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy

Auteur: Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
Uitgever: Melbourne, Vic. : Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, 2002.
Serie: Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia working paper, no. 03/02.
Editie/Formaat:   Print book : Engels
Database:WorldCat
Samenvatting:
Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They
Beoordeling:

(nog niet beoordeeld) 0 met beoordelingen - U bent de eerste

Onderwerpen
Meer in deze trant

 

Zoeken naar een online exemplaar

Links naar dit item

Zoeken naar een in de bibliotheek beschikbaar exemplaar

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Bibliotheken met dit item worden gezocht…

Details

Genre: Internetbron
Soort document: Boek, Internetbron
Alle auteurs / medewerkers: Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
OCLC-nummer: 223392681
Beschrijving: 26 p. : tables, formulae ; 21 cm.
Inhoud: 1. Introduction --
2. A model of piracy and give-aways --
3. Piracy and give-aways with a single customer group --
4. Price discrimination between customer groups --
5. No price discrimination --
6. Conclusion.
Serietitel: Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia working paper, no. 03/02.
Verantwoordelijkheid: Stephen P. King and Ryan Lampe.

Fragment:

Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They show that piracy can never be profitable if the producer can directly price discriminate between potential pirates and other customers. In the absence of price discrimination, piracy will only raise profits when the ability to pirate is inversely related to customer willingness-to-pay.

Even in this situation, there is no profit maximising equilibrium where some potential pirates buy while others pirate the product. Thus, even though potential pirates differ in their ability to illegally gain the product, the profit maximising outcome involves either no piracy or complete piracy.

Beoordelingen

Beoordelingen door gebruikers
Beoordelingen van GoodReads worden opgehaald...
Bezig met opvragen DOGObooks-reviews...

Tags

U bent de eerste.

Vergelijkbare items

Verwante onderwerpen:(1)

Bevestig deze aanvraag

Misschien heeft u dit item reeds aangevraagd. Selecteer a.u.b. Ok als u toch wilt doorgaan met deze aanvraag.

Gekoppelde data


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/223392681>
library:oclcnum"223392681"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
rdf:typeschema:MediaObject
rdf:typeschema:Book
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
<http://viaf.org/viaf/262286909>
rdf:typeschema:Organization
schema:name"Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia."
schema:creator
schema:datePublished"2002"
schema:description"1. Introduction -- 2. A model of piracy and give-aways -- 3. Piracy and give-aways with a single customer group -- 4. Price discrimination between customer groups -- 5. No price discrimination -- 6. Conclusion."@en
schema:description"Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They show that piracy can never be profitable if the producer can directly price discriminate between potential pirates and other customers. In the absence of price discrimination, piracy will only raise profits when the ability to pirate is inversely related to customer willingness-to-pay."@en
schema:description"Even in this situation, there is no profit maximising equilibrium where some potential pirates buy while others pirate the product. Thus, even though potential pirates differ in their ability to illegally gain the product, the profit maximising outcome involves either no piracy or complete piracy."@en
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/134459840>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:isPartOf
<http://worldcat.org/issn/1447-2317>
rdf:typeschema:Series
schema:hasPart<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/223392681>
schema:issn"1447-2317"
schema:name"Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia. Working Paper series,"
schema:name"Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy"@en
schema:numberOfPages"26"
schema:publication
schema:publisher
wdrs:describedby

Content-negotiable representations

Venster sluiten

Meld u aan bij WorldCat 

Heeft u geen account? U kunt eenvoudig een nieuwe gratis account aanmaken.