pular para conteúdo
Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy Ver prévia deste item
FecharVer prévia deste item
Checando...

Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy

Autor: Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
Editora: Melbourne, Vic. : Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, 2002.
Séries: Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia working paper, no. 03/02.
Edição/Formato   book_printbook : Inglês
Base de Dados:WorldCat
Resumo:
Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They
Classificação:

(ainda não classificado) 0 com críticas - Seja o primeiro.

Assuntos
Mais como este

 

Encontrar uma cópia on-line

Links para este item

Encontrar uma cópia na biblioteca

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Encontrando bibliotecas que possuem este item...

Detalhes

Tipo de Material: Recurso Internet
Tipo de Documento: Livro, Recurso Internet
Todos os Autores / Contribuintes: Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
Número OCLC: 223392681
Descrição: 26 p. : tables, formulae ; 21 cm.
Conteúdos: 1. Introduction --
2. A model of piracy and give-aways --
3. Piracy and give-aways with a single customer group --
4. Price discrimination between customer groups --
5. No price discrimination --
6. Conclusion.
Título da Série: Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia working paper, no. 03/02.
Responsabilidade: Stephen P. King and Ryan Lampe.

Resumo:

Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They show that piracy can never be profitable if the producer can directly price discriminate between potential pirates and other customers. In the absence of price discrimination, piracy will only raise profits when the ability to pirate is inversely related to customer willingness-to-pay.

Even in this situation, there is no profit maximising equilibrium where some potential pirates buy while others pirate the product. Thus, even though potential pirates differ in their ability to illegally gain the product, the profit maximising outcome involves either no piracy or complete piracy.

Críticas

Críticas contribuídas por usuários
Recuperando críticas GoodReas...
Recuperando comentários DOGObooks

Etiquetas

Seja o primeiro.

Ítens Similares

Assuntos Relacionados:(1)

Confirmar esta solicitação

Você já pode ter solicitado este item. Por favor, selecione Ok se gostaria de proceder com esta solicitação de qualquer forma.

Dados Ligados


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/223392681>
library:oclcnum"223392681"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
rdf:typeschema:MediaObject
rdf:typeschema:Book
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
<http://viaf.org/viaf/262286909>
rdf:typeschema:Organization
schema:name"Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia."
schema:creator
schema:datePublished"2002"
schema:description"1. Introduction -- 2. A model of piracy and give-aways -- 3. Piracy and give-aways with a single customer group -- 4. Price discrimination between customer groups -- 5. No price discrimination -- 6. Conclusion."@en
schema:description"Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They show that piracy can never be profitable if the producer can directly price discriminate between potential pirates and other customers. In the absence of price discrimination, piracy will only raise profits when the ability to pirate is inversely related to customer willingness-to-pay."@en
schema:description"Even in this situation, there is no profit maximising equilibrium where some potential pirates buy while others pirate the product. Thus, even though potential pirates differ in their ability to illegally gain the product, the profit maximising outcome involves either no piracy or complete piracy."@en
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/134459840>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:isPartOf
<http://worldcat.org/issn/1447-2317>
rdf:typeschema:Series
schema:hasPart<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/223392681>
schema:issn"1447-2317"
schema:name"Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia. Working Paper series,"
schema:name"Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy"@en
schema:numberOfPages"26"
schema:publication
schema:publisher
wdrs:describedby

Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Por favor, conecte-se ao WorldCat 

Não tem uma conta? Você pode facilmente criar uma conta gratuita.