跳到内容
Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy 预览资料
关闭预览资料
正在查...

Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy

著者: Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
出版商: Melbourne, Vic. : Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, 2002.
丛书: Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia working paper, no. 03/02.
版本/格式:   图书 : 英语
数据库:WorldCat
提要:
Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They
评估:

(尚未评估) 0 附有评论 - 争取成为第一个。

主题
更多类似这样的

 

在线查找

与资料的链接

在图书馆查找

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; 正在查找有这资料的图书馆...

详细书目

材料类型: 互联网资源
文件类型: 书, 互联网资源
所有的著者/提供者: Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
OCLC号码: 223392681
描述: 26 p. : tables, formulae ; 21 cm.
内容: 1. Introduction --
2. A model of piracy and give-aways --
3. Piracy and give-aways with a single customer group --
4. Price discrimination between customer groups --
5. No price discrimination --
6. Conclusion.
丛书名: Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia working paper, no. 03/02.
责任: Stephen P. King and Ryan Lampe.

摘要:

Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They show that piracy can never be profitable if the producer can directly price discriminate between potential pirates and other customers. In the absence of price discrimination, piracy will only raise profits when the ability to pirate is inversely related to customer willingness-to-pay.

Even in this situation, there is no profit maximising equilibrium where some potential pirates buy while others pirate the product. Thus, even though potential pirates differ in their ability to illegally gain the product, the profit maximising outcome involves either no piracy or complete piracy.

评论

用户提供的评论
正在获取GoodReads评论...
正在检索DOGObooks的评论

标签

争取是第一个!

相似资料

确认申请

你可能已经申请过这份资料。如果还是想申请,请选确认。

链接数据


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/223392681>
library:oclcnum"223392681"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
owl:sameAs<info:oclcnum/223392681>
rdf:typeschema:Book
rdfs:seeAlso
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:author
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
schema:datePublished"2002"
schema:description"1. Introduction -- 2. A model of piracy and give-aways -- 3. Piracy and give-aways with a single customer group -- 4. Price discrimination between customer groups -- 5. No price discrimination -- 6. Conclusion."
schema:description"Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They show that piracy can never be profitable if the producer can directly price discriminate between potential pirates and other customers. In the absence of price discrimination, piracy will only raise profits when the ability to pirate is inversely related to customer willingness-to-pay."
schema:description"Even in this situation, there is no profit maximising equilibrium where some potential pirates buy while others pirate the product. Thus, even though potential pirates differ in their ability to illegally gain the product, the profit maximising outcome involves either no piracy or complete piracy."
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/134459840>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:name"Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy"
schema:numberOfPages"26"
schema:publisher
rdf:typeschema:Organization
schema:name"Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia"

Content-negotiable representations

关闭窗口

请登入WorldCat 

没有张号吗?很容易就可以 建立免费的账号.