跳至内容
Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy 線上預覽
關閉線上預覽
正在查...

Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy

作者: Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
出版商: Melbourne, Vic. : Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, 2002.
叢書: Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia working paper, no. 03/02.
版本/格式:   圖書 : 英語
資料庫:WorldCat
提要:
Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They
評定級別:

(尚未評分) 0 附有評論 - 成爲第一個。

主題
更多類似這樣的

 

在線上查詢

與資料的連結

在圖書館查詢

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; 正在查詢有此資料的圖書館...

詳細書目

資料類型: 網際網路資源
文件類型: 圖書, 網路資源
所有的作者/貢獻者: Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
OCLC系統控制編碼: 223392681
描述: 26 p. : tables, formulae ; 21 cm.
内容: 1. Introduction --
2. A model of piracy and give-aways --
3. Piracy and give-aways with a single customer group --
4. Price discrimination between customer groups --
5. No price discrimination --
6. Conclusion.
叢書名: Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia working paper, no. 03/02.
責任: Stephen P. King and Ryan Lampe.

摘要:

Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They show that piracy can never be profitable if the producer can directly price discriminate between potential pirates and other customers. In the absence of price discrimination, piracy will only raise profits when the ability to pirate is inversely related to customer willingness-to-pay.

Even in this situation, there is no profit maximising equilibrium where some potential pirates buy while others pirate the product. Thus, even though potential pirates differ in their ability to illegally gain the product, the profit maximising outcome involves either no piracy or complete piracy.

評論

讀者提供的評論
正在擷取GoodReads評論...
正在擷取DOGObooks的評論

標籤

成爲第一個

類似資料

確認申請

你可能已經申請過這份資料。若還是想申請,請選確認。

連結資料


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/223392681>
library:oclcnum"223392681"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
owl:sameAs<info:oclcnum/223392681>
rdf:typeschema:Book
schema:about
schema:about
<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1064763>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Piracy (Copyright)--Economic aspects"@en
schema:name"Piracy (Copyright)--Economic aspects."@en
schema:about
schema:about
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
<http://viaf.org/viaf/262286909>
rdf:typeschema:Organization
schema:name"Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia."
schema:creator
schema:datePublished"2002"
schema:description"1. Introduction -- 2. A model of piracy and give-aways -- 3. Piracy and give-aways with a single customer group -- 4. Price discrimination between customer groups -- 5. No price discrimination -- 6. Conclusion."@en
schema:description"Recent papers have argued that a firm might be able to raise its profit by allowing some customers to steal its product. In particular, with network externalities, so that customers value the product more highly the more widely the product is used, it is claimed that piracy can be profitable. In this paper, the authors analyse these claims when the producer can freely choose the degree of piracy prevention. They show that piracy can never be profitable if the producer can directly price discriminate between potential pirates and other customers. In the absence of price discrimination, piracy will only raise profits when the ability to pirate is inversely related to customer willingness-to-pay."@en
schema:description"Even in this situation, there is no profit maximising equilibrium where some potential pirates buy while others pirate the product. Thus, even though potential pirates differ in their ability to illegally gain the product, the profit maximising outcome involves either no piracy or complete piracy."@en
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/134459840>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:name"Network externalities and the myth of profitable piracy"@en
schema:numberOfPages"26"
schema:publisher
schema:url

Content-negotiable representations

關閉視窗

請登入WorldCat 

没有帳號嗎?你可很容易的 建立免費的帳號.