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|All Authors / Contributors:||
|Description:||xi, 216 p. ; 24 cm.|
|Contents:||1. Introduction --
2. The Semantic Framework --
3. Empirical Counterparts and Hart's Semantics --
4. Mind-Dependence and Cognitivism --
5. Substantive Disagreement and Indeterminacy --
6. Conceptions of Practice.
The discussion is firmly grounded in metaphysics, which sets the book apart from other similar discussions in jurisprudence. Stavropoulos identifies an important source of resistance to acceptance of the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation: a widely-held but faulty semantic. He then develops an alternative semantic framework which draws on influential theories in contemporary philosophy. The book shows that objectivism is a natural, commonsensical position, and rejects the currently popular notion that objectivism requires extravagant or bizarre metaphysics. Furthermore, the discussion presents the opportunity to reinterpret major debates in jurisprudence and to show how influential theories, notably H. L. A. Hart's and Ronald Dworkin's, bear on that central issue.