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On Myopia as Rationale for Social Security

Author: Torben Andersen; Joydeep Bhattacharya
Publisher: München : CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for economic research, 2008.
Series: CESifo working paper series, 2401.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go social security in dynamically efficient economies. Contrary to received wisdom, if the real interest rate is exogenously fixed, enough myopia may justify public pensions but never alongside positive private savings. With sufficient myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Torben Andersen; Joydeep Bhattacharya
OCLC Number: 429211003
Description: 1 online resource (Text.)
Series Title: CESifo working paper series, 2401.
Responsibility: Torben Andersen, Joydeep Bhattacharya.

Abstract:

This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go social security in dynamically efficient economies. Contrary to received wisdom, if the real interest rate is exogenously fixed, enough myopia may justify public pensions but never alongside positive private savings. With sufficient myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the real interest rate on saving evolves endogenously, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.

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