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| 附加的形体格式： | Online version: Steward, Helen. Ontology of mind. Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1997 (OCoLC)645846323 |
|---|---|
| 文件类型： | 书 |
| 所有的著者/提供者： |
Helen Steward |
| ISBN: | 0198240988 9780198240983 |
| OCLC号码： | 36083656 |
| 注意： | Based on the author's doctoral thesis. |
| 描述： | viii, 276 p. ; 23 cm. |
| 内容： | Events and Processes -- Events, Particularity, and Properties -- Kim: Exemplifications of Properties at Times -- Property Exemplifications and Theories of Mind -- Particularity and the Secret Life Requirement -- Bennett: Events as Tropes -- Bennett's Argument against Anomalous Monism -- Events as Changes -- Happenings -- Events as Changes in Objects -- Is there a Motivation for the RCO? -- Composite Events and the Composition Relation -- Are there Changeless Events? -- States and Change -- The Temporal Strategy: Time and Aspect -- Vendler and Kenny -- Types of Verb versus Types of Predication -- Aspect -- Nominalization Transcriptions: Events and Processes -- Non-paradigmatic Events -- Event and Process as Ontological Categories -- Temporal Shape -- States, Causation, and Causal Explanation -- States and the Type-Token Distinction -- States and Properties -- Nominalization Transcriptions: States -- The 'State of ...' Locution -- The Type-Token Distinction -- Token States in Philosophy of Mind -- Particulars, Facts, and Causal Explanations -- Forms of Causal Explanation -- Singular Causal Claims -- Sentential Causal Explanations -- The Existential Generalization Account -- Causation and Causal Explanation -- Efficacy, Causing, and Relevance -- Child on Causation and Causal Explanation -- Program and Process Explanations -- Sentential Explanations as Program Explanations -- Why there are no Causally Efficacious Properties -- States and Causality in Philosophy of Mind -- The Network Model of Causation in Philosophy of Mind. |
| 丛书名： | Oxford philosophical monographs. |
| 责任： | Helen Steward. |
| 更多信息： |
摘要：
Helen Steward puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the nature of some of the sorts of mental entities it postulates - the nature of events, processes and states. She offers a fresh investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinction between them, and argues specifically that the assumption that states can be treated as particular, event-like entities has been a huge and serious mistake. Steward argues that the category of 'token state' should be rejected, and develops an alternative way of understanding those varieties of causal explanation which have sometimes been thought to require an ontology of token states for their elucidation.
She contends that many current theories of mind are rendered unintelligible once it is seen how these explanations really work. A number of prominent features of contemporary philosophy of mind - token identity theories, the functionalist's conception of causal role, a common form of argument for eliminative materialism, and the structure of the debate about the efficacy of mental content - are impugned by her arguments. Steward concludes that the modern mind-body problem needs to be substantially rethought.
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