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Optimal contracts for independent central bankers : private information, performance measures and reappointment

Author: Carl E Walsh; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Publisher: San Francisco, CA : Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1993.
Series: Working papers in applied economic theory (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco), 93-02
Edition/Format:   Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
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Additional Physical Format: Online version:
Walsh, Carl E.
Optimal contracts for independent central bankers.
San Francisco, CA : Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1993
(OCoLC)647499938
Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: Carl E Walsh; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
OCLC Number: 28211391
Notes: "May 1993."
Description: 33 pages ; 28 cm.
Series Title: Working papers in applied economic theory (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco), 93-02
Responsibility: Carl E. Walsh.

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