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Optimal Regulation and the Law of International Trade : the Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law

Author: Boris Rigod
Publisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Series: Cambridge international trade and economic law, no. 18.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Are the limitations imposed on World Trade Organization (WTO) members' right to regulate efficient? This is a question that is only scarcely, if ever, analysed in existing literature. Boris Rigod aims to provide an answer to this fundamental concern. Using the tools of economic analysis and in particular the concept of economic efficiency as a benchmark, the author states that domestic regulatory measures should  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Erscheint auch als:
Rigod, Boris. Optimal Regulation and the Law of International Trade .
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law
Druck-Ausgabe
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Boris Rigod
ISBN: 9781316336984 1316336980
OCLC Number: 932461739
Notes: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 15 Dec 2015).
Description: 1 online resource (322 pages).
Contents: Cover; Half-title page; Series page; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; Figures; Tables; Foreword; Acknowledgements; Table of cases; Introduction; Part I Optimal regulation and international trade law --
theory; 1 Introduction to Part I; 2 Optimal regulation; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The socially optimal level of regulation; 2.3 Costs and benefits; 2.4 Optimal regulation and incertitude; 2.5 Conclusion; 3 Deviations from optimal regulation; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Market power; 3.3 Public choice, lobby power and regulatory capture; 3.4 Systemic biases and public risk perception; 3.5 Conclusion 4 Deviations from optimal regulation and the role of international trade agreements4.1 The economic rationale for trade agreements; 4.2 The economic rationale for regulating domestic instruments; 4.3 The economic rationale for the SPS and the TBT Agreement; 4.4 Conclusion; 5 Conclusion on Part I; Part II Optimal regulation and international trade law --
application; 6 Introduction to Part II; 7 Domestic regulation and the GATT; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Article III:4 GATT; 7.3 Article XX GATT; 7.4 Conclusion on GATT case law; 8 Domestic regulation and the TBT Agreement; 8.1 Introduction 4 Deviations from optimal regulation and the role of international trade agreements4.1 The economic rationale for trade agreements; 4.2 The economic rationale for regulating domestic instruments; 4.3 The economic rationale for the SPS and the TBT Agreement; 4.4 Conclusion; 5 Conclusion on Part I; Part II Optimal regulation and international trade law --
application; 6 Introduction to Part II; 7 Domestic regulation and the GATT; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Article III:4 GATT; 7.3 Article XX GATT; 7.4 Conclusion on GATT case law; 8 Domestic regulation and the TBT Agreement; 8.1 Introduction
Series Title: Cambridge international trade and economic law, no. 18.
Other Titles: Optimal Regulation & the Law of International Trade
Responsibility: Boris Rigod.

Abstract:

This book applies a law and economics methodology to enquire into the interface between regulation and international trade law.  Read more...

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