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Overcoming the common pool problem through voluntary cooperation : the rise and fall of a fishery cooperative

Author: Robert T Deacon; Dominic P Parker; Christopher J Costello; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2010.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 16339.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
We analyze a seldom used, but highly promising form of rights-based management over common pool resources that involves the self-selection of heterogeneous fishermen into sectors. The fishery management regime assigns one portion of an overall catch quota to a voluntary cooperative, with the remainder exploited as a commons by those choosing to fish independently. Data from an Alaska commercial salmon fishery  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Robert T Deacon; Dominic P Parker; Christopher J Costello; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 662406620
Notes: "September 2010."
Title from http://www.nber.org/papers/16339 viewed Sept. 7, 2010.
Description: 1 online resource (44 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 16339.
Responsibility: Robert T. Deacon, Dominic P. Parker, Christopher Costello.

Abstract:

We analyze a seldom used, but highly promising form of rights-based management over common pool resources that involves the self-selection of heterogeneous fishermen into sectors. The fishery management regime assigns one portion of an overall catch quota to a voluntary cooperative, with the remainder exploited as a commons by those choosing to fish independently. Data from an Alaska commercial salmon fishery confirm our model's key predictions, that the co-op would facilitate the consolidation of fishing effort, coordination of harvest activities, sharing of information and provision of shared infrastructure. We estimate that the resulting rent gains were at least 25%. A lawsuit filed by two disgruntled independents led to the co-op's demise, an outcome also predicted by our model. Our analysis provides guidance for designing fishery reform that leads to Pareto improvements for fishermen of all skill levels, which suggests a structure that enables reform without losers.

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