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Pacification and the Viet Cong system in Dinh Tuong, 1966-1967

Author: David W P Elliott; William A Stewart; United States. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs); United States. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
Publisher: Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 1969 [i.e. 1975]
Series: Memorandum (Rand Corporation), RM-5788-ISA/ARPA.
Edition/Format:   Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
An analysis of the Viet Cong system in Dinh Tuong Province and its reaction to the 1966 GVN pacification program. Focus is on how the VC system is organized, how it functions, its strategy and tactics, and its reaction to perturbation. The system is shown to be a well-balanced, mutually dependent organization of military and political forces. In 1966-1967, the VC reacted tactically to GVN pacification by reemploying  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Military history
Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: David W P Elliott; William A Stewart; United States. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs); United States. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
OCLC Number: 2675564
Notes: "Prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs and the Advanced Research Projects Agency."
"Research ... supported by the Department of Defense under contracts DAHC15 67 C 0142 and DAHC15 67 C 0143."
Description: xiii, 105 pages, [1] folded leaf of plates : illustrations ; 28 cm.
Series Title: Memorandum (Rand Corporation), RM-5788-ISA/ARPA.
Responsibility: David W.P. Elliott and W.A. Stewart.

Abstract:

An analysis of the Viet Cong system in Dinh Tuong Province and its reaction to the 1966 GVN pacification program. Focus is on how the VC system is organized, how it functions, its strategy and tactics, and its reaction to perturbation. The system is shown to be a well-balanced, mutually dependent organization of military and political forces. In 1966-1967, the VC reacted tactically to GVN pacification by reemploying earlier village defense concepts and by harassing urban areas to force government units back to a city defense. Politically, they decentralized authority from district to intervillage levels and returned previously promoted cadres to supervise the areas. The analysis indicates that the VC operational balance could be upset by (1) interdiction of the communications process through controlling territory, intercepting essential cadres, or cutting LOCs; (2) denying VC military protection essential cadres, thereby reducing their effectiveness; (3) driving out Local Force units which inhibit GVN entrance into an area and which are indispensable for a delicate balance of force support and protection; (4) refraining from punishment of low level VC members, whose fear of GVN retribution locks them into the VC system; (5) pressuring the system at several points simultaneously to offset its capacity to overcome vulnerabilities.

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