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Patent renewal fees and self-funding patent offices

著者: Joshua Gans; Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia (Melbourne, Vic.)
出版: [Melbourne] : IPRIA, 2004.
シリーズ: Working paper series (Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia), No. 01/04.
エディション/フォーマット:   書籍 : Englishすべてのエディションとフォーマットを見る
データベース:WorldCat
概要:
A socially optimal structure of application and renewal fees for patents would encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. In this paper, the authors find that when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resource constraints can distort this fee structue. Specifically, a financially constrained, but welfare-oriented patent office will tend to raise initial  続きを読む
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資料の種類: インターネット資料
ドキュメントの種類: 図書, インターネットリソース
すべての著者/寄与者: Joshua Gans; Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia (Melbourne, Vic.)
OCLC No.: 57309848
注記: "January 2004."
物理形態: 20 p. : ill. ; 22 cm.
コンテンツ: Introduction --
1. Basic model set-up --
2. Socially optimal patent fees --
3. Self-funding patent offices --
4. Conclusion.
シリーズタイトル: Working paper series (Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia), No. 01/04.
責任者: Joshua Gans, Stephen P. King and Ryan Lampe.

概要:

A socially optimal structure of application and renewal fees for patents would encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. In this paper, the authors find that when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resource constraints can distort this fee structue. Specifically, a financially constrained, but welfare-oriented patent office will tend to raise initial application fees while lowering renewal fees. This creates two detriments to social welfare as it discourages the filing of some patents while extending the effective life of others.

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