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Patent renewal fees and self-funding patent offices

著者: Joshua Gans; Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia (Melbourne, Vic.)
出版商: [Melbourne] : IPRIA, 2004.
丛书: Working paper series (Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia), No. 01/04.
版本/格式:   图书 : 英语查看所有的版本和格式
数据库:WorldCat
提要:
A socially optimal structure of application and renewal fees for patents would encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. In this paper, the authors find that when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resource constraints can distort this fee structue. Specifically, a financially constrained, but welfare-oriented patent office will tend to raise initial  再读一些...
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材料类型: 互联网资源
文件类型: 书, 互联网资源
所有的著者/提供者: Joshua Gans; Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia (Melbourne, Vic.)
OCLC号码: 57309848
注意: "January 2004."
描述: 20 p. : ill. ; 22 cm.
内容: Introduction --
1. Basic model set-up --
2. Socially optimal patent fees --
3. Self-funding patent offices --
4. Conclusion.
丛书名: Working paper series (Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia), No. 01/04.
责任: Joshua Gans, Stephen P. King and Ryan Lampe.

摘要:

A socially optimal structure of application and renewal fees for patents would encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. In this paper, the authors find that when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resource constraints can distort this fee structue. Specifically, a financially constrained, but welfare-oriented patent office will tend to raise initial application fees while lowering renewal fees. This creates two detriments to social welfare as it discourages the filing of some patents while extending the effective life of others.

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