Joshua Gans; Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia (Melbourne, Vic.)
|描述：||20 p. : ill. ; 22 cm.|
1. Basic model set-up --
2. Socially optimal patent fees --
3. Self-funding patent offices --
|丛书名：||Working paper series (Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia), No. 01/04.|
|责任：||Joshua Gans, Stephen P. King and Ryan Lampe.|
A socially optimal structure of application and renewal fees for patents would encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. In this paper, the authors find that when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resource constraints can distort this fee structue. Specifically, a financially constrained, but welfare-oriented patent office will tend to raise initial application fees while lowering renewal fees. This creates two detriments to social welfare as it discourages the filing of some patents while extending the effective life of others.