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Patent renewal fees and self-funding patent offices

作者: Joshua Gans; Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia (Melbourne, Vic.)
出版商: [Melbourne] : IPRIA, 2004.
叢書: Working paper series (Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia), No. 01/04.
版本/格式:   圖書 : 英語所有版本和格式的總覽
資料庫:WorldCat
提要:
A socially optimal structure of application and renewal fees for patents would encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. In this paper, the authors find that when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resource constraints can distort this fee structue. Specifically, a financially constrained, but welfare-oriented patent office will tend to raise initial  再讀一些...
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資料類型: 網際網路資源
文件類型: 圖書, 網路資源
所有的作者/貢獻者: Joshua Gans; Stephen P King; Ryan Lampe; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia (Melbourne, Vic.)
OCLC系統控制編碼: 57309848
注意: "January 2004."
描述: 20 p. : ill. ; 22 cm.
内容: Introduction --
1. Basic model set-up --
2. Socially optimal patent fees --
3. Self-funding patent offices --
4. Conclusion.
叢書名: Working paper series (Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia), No. 01/04.
責任: Joshua Gans, Stephen P. King and Ryan Lampe.

摘要:

A socially optimal structure of application and renewal fees for patents would encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. In this paper, the authors find that when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resource constraints can distort this fee structue. Specifically, a financially constrained, but welfare-oriented patent office will tend to raise initial application fees while lowering renewal fees. This creates two detriments to social welfare as it discourages the filing of some patents while extending the effective life of others.

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