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Peace and war in territorial disputes

Author: Herschel I Grossman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2004.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 10601.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
"Why do sovereign states sometimes fail to settle territorial disputes peacefully? Also, why do even peaceful settlements of territorial disputes rarely call for the resulting border to be unfortified? This paper explores a class of answers to these questions that is based on the following premise: States can settle a territorial dispute peacefully only if (1) their payoffs from a peaceful settlement are larger than  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Herschel I Grossman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 56339556
Notes: "June 2004."
Description: 1 online resource (28 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 10601.
Responsibility: Herschel I. Grossman.

Abstract:

"Why do sovereign states sometimes fail to settle territorial disputes peacefully? Also, why do even peaceful settlements of territorial disputes rarely call for the resulting border to be unfortified? This paper explores a class of answers to these questions that is based on the following premise: States can settle a territorial dispute peacefully only if (1) their payoffs from a peaceful settlement are larger than their expected payoffs from a default to war, and (2) their promises not to attack are credible. This premise directs the analysis to such factors as the advantage of attacking over both defending and counterattacking, the divisibility of the contested territory, the possibility of recurring war, the depreciation or obsolescence of fortifications, and inequality in the effectiveness of mobilized resources"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

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