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Document Type: | Book |
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All Authors / Contributors: |
Gareth Porter |
ISBN: | 0520250044 9780520250048 |
OCLC Number: | 901607127 |
Description: | 403 p. |
Contents: | Preface 1. The Imbalance of Power, 1953--1965 2. The Communist Powers Appease the United States 3. Eisenhower and Dulles Exploit U.S. Dominance in Vietnam 4. North Vietnamese Policy under the American Threat 5. Kennedy's Struggle with the National Security Bureaucracy 6. Johnson, McNamara, and the Tonkin Gulf Episode 7. Bureaucratic Pressures and Decisions for War 8. Dominoes, Bandwagons, and the Road to War 9. Conclusion: The Perils of Dominance Notes Select Bibliography Index |
Responsibility: | Gareth Porter [aut]. |
Reviews
Publisher Synopsis
"This illuminating and wonderfully subversive book is, without a doubt, the most important contribution to the history of US national security policy to appear in the past decade." - Andrew J. Bacevich, The Nation "This will be the most important contribution to our understanding of the war in Vietnam since the Pentagon Papers. I am not exaggerating or speaking for effect. Porter challenges - by and large successfully - most of the accepted views, especially on the importance of the domino theory, the belief that U. S. policy was driven by a perception of its weakness on the world scene, and the belligerence of Johnson and, to a lesser extent, Kennedy." - Robert Jervis, author of American Foreign Policy in a New Era" Read more...

