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Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge : new essays on consciousness and physicalism

Author: Torin Andrew Alter; Sven Walter
Publisher: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2007.
Series: Philosophy of mind series.
Edition/Format:   Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Aufsatzsammlung
Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Book, Internet Resource
All Authors / Contributors: Torin Andrew Alter; Sven Walter
ISBN: 0195171659 9780195171655
OCLC Number: 63195957
Description: x, 349 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
Contents: What RoboMary knows / Daniel Dennett --
So this is what it's like : a defense of the ability hypothesis / Laurence Nemirow --
The knowledge argument, diaphanousness, representationalism / Frank Jackson --
Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument? / Torin Alter --
What is this thing you call color : can a totally color-blind person know about color? / Knut Nordby --
What is a phenomenal concept? / Janet Levin --
Phenomenal and perceptual concepts / David Papineau --
Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraint / Joseph Levine --
Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap / David J. Chalmers --
Direct reference and dancing qualia / John Hawthorne --
Property dualism, phenomenal concepts, and the semantic premise / Stephen L. White --
Max Black's objection to mind-body identity / Ned Block --
Grasping phenomenal properties / Martine Nida-Rümelin.
Series Title: Philosophy of mind series.
Responsibility: edited by Torin Alter and Sven Walter.
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Abstract:

Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers including  Read more...

Table of Contents:

by chrisph (WorldCat user on 2007-02-14)

Contributors ix Introduction 3(12) Torin Alter Sven Walter Part One: Phenomenal Knowledge What RoboMary Knows 15(17) Daniel Dennett So This Is What It's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis 32(20) Laurence Nemirow The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism 52(13) Frank Jackson Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? 65(12) Torin Alter What Is This Thing You Call Color: Can a Totally Color-Blind Person Know about Color? 77(10) Knut Nordby Part Two: Phenomenal Concepts What Is a Phenomenal Concept? 87(24) Janet Levin Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts 111(34) David Papineau Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint 145(22) Joseph Levine Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap 167(28) David J. Chalmers Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia 195(15) John Hawthorne Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise 210(39) Stephen L. White Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity 249(58) Ned Block Grasping Phenomenal Properties 307(32) Martine Nida-Rumelin Index 339

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a useful book I would recommend to those who are working on consciousness and physicalism. Istvan Aranyosi Mind

 
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schema:description"What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. The controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal concepts--knowledge of consciousness and the associated concepts--have come to play increasingly prominent roles in this debate. Consider Frank Jackson's famous case of Mary, the super-scientist who learns all the physical information while confined in a black-and-white room. According to Jackson, if physicalism is true, then Mary's physical knowledge should allow her to deduce what it's like to see in color. Yet it seems intuitively clear that she learns something when she leaves the room. But then how can consciousness be physical? Arguably, whether this sort of reasoning is sound depends on how phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge are construed. For example, some argue that the Mary case reveals something about phenomenal concepts but has no implications for the nature of consciousness itself. Are responses along these lines adequate? Or does the problem arise again at the level of phenomenal concepts? The papers in this volume engage with the latest developments in this debate. The authors' perspectives range widely. For example, Daniel Dennett argues that anti-physicalist arguments such as the knowledge argument are simply confused; David Papineau grants that such arguments at least reveal important features of phenomenal concepts; and David Chalmers defends the anti-physicalist arguments, arguing that the "phenomenal concept strategy" cannot succeed."@en
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