Philosophy in the flesh : the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson challenge traditional western thought regarding mind and reason in their book, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (Basic Books, 1999), but oh what a tangled web of words these cognitive scientists weave in the process. And one of them a renowned linguist by trade, at that. Beginning with the first four sentences of the book, the readers should fasten their seatbelts tightly because its clear they in for a bumpy read. Sentence four of their book proclaims the previous three sentences to be “major findings of cognitive science.” Apparently the authors share a curiously anthropomorphic view of science. The reality is that cognitive science, and any other science for that matter, is inherently incapable of finding anything. Science is a method. It does not think or find. It is obvious the authors phrased this sentence in a blatant attempt to convince readers that their point of view is the indisputable, authoritative objective truth decreed by Science, when in fact this is not the case at all. By their own admission later in the book, not all cognitive scientists agree with their “findings”. As regards the “findings” contained in the first three sentences, where is it that cognitive science was supposed to have found these things? Were they found under a rock, alongside a road, or where exactly? The ideas presented in the first three sentences regarding 1) the mind, 2) thought, and 3) abstract concepts, are not findings or discoveries at all, but are theories invented by the authors. The contention that these are findings contradicts the authors’ position regarding the concept of reason. One of the major theses of their book is that the traditional view of reason as a pre-existing independent phenomena is incorrect. In their view reason “arises from the nature of our brains, bodies, and bodily experience.” (p. 4) In other words, reason is an invention rather than a discovery. Then, after emphatically making this point, how can the authors possibly justify that the theories proclaimed in the first three sentences of their book are “findings” and “empirical discoveries”? Especially given that not all cognitive scientists concur. In effect Lakoff and Johnson are saying that reason is not a finding but rather is an invention, except that the reasons Lakoff and Johnson present are not inventions at all but rather their reasons are findings. These are in fact not findings or discoveries, and to claim they are contradicts the main thrust of their work - that such things are not “disembodied” as they put it. Instead, these are subjective theories conceived by the authors and deceptively presented as objective and disembodied facts cloaked in a veil of objective science. Much of Lakoff’s and Johnson’s ideas are in reaction to the philosophy of Rene Descartes, who died in 1650. His flesh has since decomposed, but his philosophy has not. This is not meant as a defense of all the philosophical thought of Descartes, but rather a recognition that philosophy does not really inhere in flesh the same way as do blood vessels, which is precisely why philosophy is not found in an anatomy textbook. During his lifetime Descartes realized he had both a body and a mind, and Lakoff and Johnson share the same realization in regard to themselves. The difference is Descartes conceived body and mind to be autonomous entities, whereas Lakoff and Johson believe the existence of one, the mind, to be dependent on the other. Lakoff and Johnson are self-described philosophical materialists, or physicalists as they prefer to say, but they are not thorough-going materialists who believe all of reality to be composed only of matter. They are dualistic materialists who admit the existence of non-material phenomena, such as phonemes, verbs and metaphors, to use their examples (p. 109). Mind, too, fits in this category. In their view these aspects of reality do indeed exist, but only in that their existence is derived from matter. Thus, mind does exist but it cannot, as Descartes maintained, survive bodily death and become disembodied because mind is, in their view, entirely dependent on matter. Whether or not their view is accurate, it is not the case that philosophy exists only in the flesh. I myself have a shelf full of philosophy in my bookcase, where it remains if I am at home or not. They may argue that when they use the phrase “philosophy in the flesh” they do not literally mean that philosophy is in the flesh, but why then do they not frame their phrase metaphorically? Metaphor works best when one makes it unequivocally clear that metaphor is what is intended, as in stating that “it is as if philosophy is in the flesh.” The phrase “philosophy in the flesh” is in the form of a literal statement that implies that philosophy is in the flesh, when clearly this is not the case. To protest that they are speaking only metaphorically is to say they do not really mean what they say. If it is the case that they are not really serious about the claim of the title of their book, then what is it they really mean? Philosophy may be a meaty subject, and if one could slice into flesh and come upon it this would really be both a finding and an empirical discovery, but search as one may philosophy cannot be gotten at in this way. The reason is that things such as philosophy are simply different kinds of things than is flesh. It is fine and well to debate the origins of things that exist, but in the end all that can be said with certainty is that which exists does indeed exist. Philosophy, reason and minds exist just as material objects exist, regardless of their genesis. Beyond that, theories abound. Maybe god created the continuously evolving universe. Maybe there is no god and the universe and everything in it just accidentally came about. There are many such maybes. Most people have beliefs of some sort on these intellectually unresolvable issues. Lakoff and Johnson have now revealed their beliefs, but have presented them as facts. Philosophy certainly is an invention, but no one seriously disputes that it is not. It was not found in the way that trees and rocks were found. Philosophy was, and continues to be, thought up by people. Certainly every known philosopher did indeed have a body. This all seems so obvious. Is this really all the authors decided to write a 583 page book about?John Maes is, among other things, an amateur philosopher who resides in Oakland, California and holds a degree in philosophy from Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.