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A pluralist theory of the mind

Author: David Ludwig
Publisher: Cham : Springer, 2015.
Series: European studies in philosophy of science, volume 2.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
This book challenges common debates in philosophy of mind by questioning the framework of placement problems in contemporary metaphysics. The author argues that placement problems arise when exactly one fundamental ontology serves as the base for all entities, and will propose a pluralist alternative that takes the diversity of our conceptual resources and ontologies seriously. ℗ℓThis general pluralist account is  Read more...
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Details

Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Printed edition:
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: David Ludwig
ISBN: 9783319227382 3319227386
OCLC Number: 926705642
Description: 1 online resource.
Contents: Introduction --
Pluralism and Scientific Practice --
Beyond Placement Problems --
A Historical Diagnosis --
Part I In Defense of Conceptual Relativity --
Conceptual Relativity in Philosophy --
Conceptual Relativity in Science --
The Demarcation Problem of Conceptual Relativity --
Part II From Conceptual Relativity to Vertical Pluralism --
The Argument from Horizontal Pluralism --
The Argument from Ontological Non-Fundamentalism --
Part III Beyond the Mind-Body Problem --
Consciousness --
Beyond Dualism and Physicalism --
Mental Causation --
Epilogue: Metaphysics in a Complex World.
Series Title: European studies in philosophy of science, volume 2.
Responsibility: David Ludwig.

Abstract:

This book challenges common debates in philosophy of mind by questioning the framework of placement problems in contemporary metaphysics. The author argues that placement problems arise when exactly one fundamental ontology serves as the base for all entities, and will propose a pluralist alternative that takes the diversity of our conceptual resources and ontologies seriously. ℗ℓThis general pluralist account is applied to issues in philosophy of mind to argue that contemporary debates about the mind-body problem are built on this problematic framework of placement problems. The starting point is the plurality of ontologies in scientific practice. Not only can we describe the world in terms of physical, biological, or psychological ontologies, but any serious engagement with scientific ontologies will identify more specific ontologies in each domain. For example, there is not one unified ontology for biology, but rather a diversity of scientific specializations with different ontological needs. Based on this account of℗ℓscientific practice the author argues that there is no reason to assume that℗ℓ ontological unification must be possible everywhere. Without this ideal, the scope of ontological unification turns out to be an open empirical question and there is no need to present unification failures as philosophically puzzling ℓ́ℓplacement problemsℓ́ℓ.
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