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|All Authors / Contributors:||
Federico Sturzenegger; Mariano Tommasi
|Description:||VI, 380 p.|
|Contents:||Part 1 Why? (the positive political economy of reforms) - inaction and delay: the political economy of delayed reform, Allan Drazen; resistance to reform - status quo bias in the presence of individual-specific uncertainty, Raquel Fernandez, Dani Rodrik; why are stabilization delayed? Alberto Alesina, Allan Drazen; fiscal conservatism as a response to the debt crisis, Raul Laban, Federico Sturzenegger; the benefit of crises for economic reforms, allan Drazen, Vittorio Grilli; dynamics - recurrent high inflation and stabilization - a dynamic game, Guillermo Mondino et al; the common property approach to the political economy of fiscal policy, Andres Velasco; fiscal discipline in a union, Joshua Aizenman; the rush to free trade in the developing world - why so late? why now? will it last? Dani Rodrik. Part 2 How? (strategies for reformers): the design of reform packages under uncertainty, Mathias Dewatripont, Gerard Roland; gradualism versus Big-Bang - speed and sustainability of reforms, Shang-Jin Wei; sequencing of economic reforms in the presence of political constraints, Cesar Martinelli, Mariano Tommasi. Part 3 Who? (the identity of reformers): promises, promises - credible policy reform via signalling, dani Rodrik; credibility of policymakers and of economic reforms, Alex Cukierman, Mariano Tommasi; the feasibility of low inflation - theory with an application to the Argentine case, Ricardo Lopez Murphy, Federico Sturzenegger.|
|Responsibility:||edited by Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi.|
"The Asian crises have once again highlighted the importance ofpolitics in economic policy formulation. This volume is thereforeespecially welcome, containing many of the promising models of