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Political Risk Aversion.

Author: Laura Valderrama
Publisher: Washington : International Monetary Fund, 2009.
Series: IMF Working Papers.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
This paper studies the effect of individual uncertainty on collective decision-making to implement innovation. We show how individual uncertainty creates a bias for the status quo even under irreversible voting decisions, in contrast with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Blocking innovation is rooted in the aversion to the potential loss of political clout in future voting decisions. Thus, risk neutral individuals  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Valderrama, Laura.
Political Risk Aversion.
Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2009
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Laura Valderrama
ISBN: 9781452709703 145270970X
OCLC Number: 870245339
Description: 1 online resource (56 pages).
Contents: Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Basic Model; A. Economic Environment; B. Technology Choice; C. Aggregate Uncertainty; III. Institutional Reform; A. Outside Ownership; B. Endogenizing Ownership; C. Dominated Employee Ownership; IV. Efficieny, Innovation, and Labor Mobility; A. Partnership Efficiency; 1. Technological and Institutional Efficiency; B. Institutional Efficiency; 2. Endogeneous ownership; V. Discussion; A. How does the model fit the facts?; B. Foundations of Individual Uncertainty; C. Heterogeneous Investors; VI. Related Literature. VII. Concluding RemarksReferences; Footnotes.
Series Title: IMF Working Papers.

Abstract:

This paper studies the effect of individual uncertainty on collective decision-making to implement innovation. We show how individual uncertainty creates a bias for the status quo even under irreversible voting decisions, in contrast with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Blocking innovation is rooted in the aversion to the potential loss of political clout in future voting decisions. Thus, risk neutral individuals exhibit what we call political risk aversion. Yet individual uncertainty is not all bad news as it may open the door to institutional reform. We endogenize institutional reform and show.

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