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The problem that wasn't : coordination failures in sovereign debt restructurings

Author: Ran Bi; Marcos Chamon; Jeromin Zettelmeyer; International Monetary Fund. Research Department,; International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, and Review Department,
Publisher: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2011.
Series: IMF working paper, WP/11/265.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : International government publication : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently attractive vis-à-vis holding out, full participation can be an equilibrium. Legal innovations such as minimum  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Zettelmeyer, Jeromin.
Problem that Wasn't: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings.
Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2011
Material Type: Document, Government publication, International government publication, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Ran Bi; Marcos Chamon; Jeromin Zettelmeyer; International Monetary Fund. Research Department,; International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, and Review Department,
ISBN: 1283555514 9781283555517 9781463930448 1463930445
OCLC Number: 763181108
Notes: At head of title: Research Department and Strategy, Policy and Review Department.
Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed November 22, 2011).
"November 2011."
Description: 1 online resource (29 pages).
Contents: Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Experiences With Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 1998-2010; III. Model; A. Baseline Set-Up; B. Eqbuilirbia in the Baseline Set-Up; C. Endogenizing the Hair-Cut; D. Equilibria with Exit Consents and Minimum Participation Threshold; E. Equilibria Under Collective Action Clauses; IV. Equilibria With Large Players; V. Conclusion; Appendix; Figure 1. Possible Equilibria as a Function of the Haircut and Litigation Prospects; Figure 2. Equilibrium Haircut Offered by the Country. Figure 3. Equilibrium Haircut Offered by the Country with Coordination in the Higher Participation EquilibriumReferences; Footnotes.
Series Title: IMF working paper, WP/11/265.
Responsibility: Ran Bi, Marcos Chamon, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer.

Abstract:

Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently attractive vis-à-vis holding out, full participation can be an equilibrium. Legal innovations such as minimum participation thresholds and defensive exit consents helped coordinate creditors and avoid litigation. Unlike CACs, exit consents can be exploited to force high haircuts on creditors, but the ability of creditors to coordinate to block exit consents can limit overly aggressive use.

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