zum Inhalt wechseln
Prosecutors in the boardroom : using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct Titelvorschau
SchließenTitelvorschau
Prüfung…

Prosecutors in the boardroom : using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct

Verfasser/in: Anthony S Barkow; Rachel E Barkow
Verlag: New York : New York University Press, ©2011.
Ausgabe/Format   E-Book : Dokument : EnglischAlle Ausgaben und Formate anzeigen
Datenbank:WorldCat
Zusammenfassung:
Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is  Weiterlesen…
Bewertung:

(noch nicht bewertet) 0 mit Rezensionen - Verfassen Sie als Erste eine Rezension.

Themen
Ähnliche Titel

 

Online anzeigen

Links zu diesem Titel

Exemplar ausleihen

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Suche nach Bibliotheken, die diesen Titel besitzen ...

Details

Gattung/Form: Electronic books
Physisches Format Print version:
Prosecutors in the boardroom.
New York : New York University Press, ©2011
(DLC) 2010047467
(OCoLC)682920771
Medientyp: Dokument, Internetquelle
Dokumenttyp: Internet-Ressource, Computer-Datei
Alle Autoren: Anthony S Barkow; Rachel E Barkow
ISBN: 9780814709375 0814709370 9780814723142 0814723144
OCLC-Nummer: 731226490
Beschreibung: 1 online resource (x, 277 pages) : illustrations
Inhalt: Introduction / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow --
The causes of corporate crime : an economic perspective / Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen --
Deferred prosecution agreements on trial : lessons from the law of unconstitutional conditions / Richard A. Epstein --
Removing prosecutors from the boardroom : limiting prosecutorial discretion to impose structural reforms / Jennifer Arlen --
Potentially perverse effects of corporate civil liability / Samuel W. Buell --
Inside-out enforcement / Lisa Kern Griffin --
The institutional logic of preventive crime / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar --
Collaborative organizational prosecution / Brandon L. Garrett --
The prosecutor as regulatory agency / Rachel E. Barkow --
What are the rules if everybody wants to play? Multiple federal and state prosecutors (acting) as regulators / Sara Sun Beale --
Reforming the corporate monitor? / Vikramaditya Khanna --
Conclusion / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow.
Verfasserangabe: edited by Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow.

Abstract:

Analyzes the controversial legal intervention of controlling corporate bodies through outside agencies rather than pressing legal charges  Weiterlesen…

Rezensionen

Redaktionelle Rezension

Nielsen BookData

"Prosecutors in the Boardroom...supplies a wealth of empirical data about contemporary corporate law enforcement policy...[and] demonstrates what happens when well-intentioned, intelligent, dedicated Weiterlesen…

 
Nutzer-Rezensionen
Suche nach GoodReads-Rezensionen
Suche nach DOGObooks-Rezensionen…

Tags

Tragen Sie als Erste Tags ein.
Anfrage bestätigen

Sie haben diesen Titel bereits angefordert. Wenn Sie trotzdem fortfahren möchten, klicken Sie auf OK.

Verlinkung


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/731226490>
library:oclcnum"731226490"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
owl:sameAs<info:oclcnum/731226490>
rdf:typeschema:Book
schema:about
schema:about
<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008101259>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Corporation law--United States--Criminal provisions."@en
schema:about
<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/879734>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Corporation law--Criminal provisions"@en
schema:name"Corporation law--Criminal provisions."@en
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:bookFormatschema:EBook
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
schema:copyrightYear"2011"
schema:datePublished"2011"
schema:description"Introduction / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow -- The causes of corporate crime : an economic perspective / Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen -- Deferred prosecution agreements on trial : lessons from the law of unconstitutional conditions / Richard A. Epstein -- Removing prosecutors from the boardroom : limiting prosecutorial discretion to impose structural reforms / Jennifer Arlen -- Potentially perverse effects of corporate civil liability / Samuel W. Buell -- Inside-out enforcement / Lisa Kern Griffin -- The institutional logic of preventive crime / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar -- Collaborative organizational prosecution / Brandon L. Garrett -- The prosecutor as regulatory agency / Rachel E. Barkow -- What are the rules if everybody wants to play? Multiple federal and state prosecutors (acting) as regulators / Sara Sun Beale -- Reforming the corporate monitor? / Vikramaditya Khanna -- Conclusion / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow."@en
schema:description"Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, a."@en
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/1044669323>
schema:genre"Electronic books."@en
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:name"Prosecutors in the boardroom using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct"@en
schema:publisher
schema:url<http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=865360>
schema:url
schema:url<http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780814709375/>
schema:url<http://site.ebrary.com/id/10476308>
schema:url<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=368439>
schema:workExample
schema:workExample

Content-negotiable representations

Fenster schließen

Bitte in WorldCat einloggen 

Sie haben kein Konto? Sie können sehr einfach ein kostenloses Konto anlegen,.