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Prosecutors in the boardroom : using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct

Autor: Anthony S Barkow; Rachel E Barkow
Editorial: New York : New York University Press, ©2011.
Edición/Formato:   Libro-e : Documento : Inglés (eng)Ver todas las ediciones y todos los formatos
Base de datos:WorldCat
Resumen:
Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is  Leer más
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Género/Forma: Electronic books
Formato físico adicional: Print version:
Prosecutors in the boardroom.
New York : New York University Press, c2011
(DLC) 2010047467
(OCoLC)682920771
Tipo de material: Documento, Recurso en Internet
Tipo de documento: Recurso en Internet, Archivo de computadora
Todos autores / colaboradores: Anthony S Barkow; Rachel E Barkow
ISBN: 9780814709375 0814709370 9780814723142 0814723144
Número OCLC: 731226490
Descripción: 1 online resource (x, 277 p.) : ill.
Contenido: Introduction / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow --
The causes of corporate crime : an economic perspective / Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen --
Deferred prosecution agreements on trial : lessons from the law of unconstitutional conditions / Richard A. Epstein --
Removing prosecutors from the boardroom : limiting prosecutorial discretion to impose structural reforms / Jennifer Arlen --
Potentially perverse effects of corporate civil liability / Samuel W. Buell --
Inside-out enforcement / Lisa Kern Griffin --
The institutional logic of preventive crime / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar --
Collaborative organizational prosecution / Brandon L. Garrett --
The prosecutor as regulatory agency / Rachel E. Barkow --
What are the rules if everybody wants to play? Multiple federal and state prosecutors (acting) as regulators / Sara Sun Beale --
Reforming the corporate monitor? / Vikramaditya Khanna --
Conclusion / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow.
Responsabilidad: edited by Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow.

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Analyzes the controversial legal intervention of controlling corporate bodies through outside agencies rather than pressing legal charges  Leer más

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"Prosecutors in the Boardroom...supplies a wealth of empirical data about contemporary corporate law enforcement policy...[and] demonstrates what happens when well-intentioned, intelligent, dedicated Leer más

 
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Datos enlazados


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