aller au contenu
Prosecutors in the boardroom : using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct Aperçu de cet ouvrage
FermerAperçu de cet ouvrage
Vérifiant…

Prosecutors in the boardroom : using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct

Auteur : Anthony S Barkow; Rachel E Barkow
Éditeur : New York : New York University Press, ©2011.
Édition/format :   Livre électronique : Document : AnglaisVoir toutes les éditions et les formats
Base de données :WorldCat
Résumé :
Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is  Lire la suite...
Évaluation :

(pas encore évalué) 0 avec des critiques - Soyez le premier.

Sujets
Plus comme ceci

 

Trouver un exemplaire en ligne

Liens vers cet ouvrage

Trouver un exemplaire dans la bibliothèque

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Recherche de bibliothèques qui possèdent cet ouvrage...

Détails

Genre/forme : Electronic books
Format – détails additionnels : Print version:
Prosecutors in the boardroom.
New York : New York University Press, c2011
(DLC) 2010047467
(OCoLC)682920771
Type d’ouvrage : Document, Ressource Internet
Format : Ressource Internet, Fichier informatique
Tous les auteurs / collaborateurs : Anthony S Barkow; Rachel E Barkow
ISBN : 9780814709375 0814709370 9780814723142 0814723144
Numéro OCLC : 731226490
Description : 1 online resource (x, 277 p.) : ill.
Contenu : Introduction / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow --
The causes of corporate crime : an economic perspective / Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen --
Deferred prosecution agreements on trial : lessons from the law of unconstitutional conditions / Richard A. Epstein --
Removing prosecutors from the boardroom : limiting prosecutorial discretion to impose structural reforms / Jennifer Arlen --
Potentially perverse effects of corporate civil liability / Samuel W. Buell --
Inside-out enforcement / Lisa Kern Griffin --
The institutional logic of preventive crime / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar --
Collaborative organizational prosecution / Brandon L. Garrett --
The prosecutor as regulatory agency / Rachel E. Barkow --
What are the rules if everybody wants to play? Multiple federal and state prosecutors (acting) as regulators / Sara Sun Beale --
Reforming the corporate monitor? / Vikramaditya Khanna --
Conclusion / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow.
Responsabilité : edited by Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow.

Résumé :

Analyzes the controversial legal intervention of controlling corporate bodies through outside agencies rather than pressing legal charges  Lire la suite...

Critiques

Critiques éditoriales

Synopsis de l’éditeur

"Prosecutors in the Boardroom...supplies a wealth of empirical data about contemporary corporate law enforcement policy...[and] demonstrates what happens when well-intentioned, intelligent, dedicated Lire la suite...

 
Critiques d’utilisateurs
Récupération des critiques de GoodReads...
Récuperation des critiques DOGObooks…

Tags

Soyez le premier.

Ouvrages semblables

Confirmez cette demande

Vous avez peut-être déjà demandé cet ouvrage. Veuillez sélectionner OK si vous voulez poursuivre avec cette demande quand même.

Données liées


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/731226490>
library:oclcnum"731226490"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
owl:sameAs<info:oclcnum/731226490>
rdf:typeschema:Book
rdfs:seeAlso
schema:about
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"LAW--Criminal Law--General."
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:bookFormatschema:EBook
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
schema:copyrightYear"2011"
schema:datePublished"2011"
schema:description"Introduction / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow -- The causes of corporate crime : an economic perspective / Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen -- Deferred prosecution agreements on trial : lessons from the law of unconstitutional conditions / Richard A. Epstein -- Removing prosecutors from the boardroom : limiting prosecutorial discretion to impose structural reforms / Jennifer Arlen -- Potentially perverse effects of corporate civil liability / Samuel W. Buell -- Inside-out enforcement / Lisa Kern Griffin -- The institutional logic of preventive crime / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar -- Collaborative organizational prosecution / Brandon L. Garrett -- The prosecutor as regulatory agency / Rachel E. Barkow -- What are the rules if everybody wants to play? Multiple federal and state prosecutors (acting) as regulators / Sara Sun Beale -- Reforming the corporate monitor? / Vikramaditya Khanna -- Conclusion / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow."
schema:description"Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, a"
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/1044669323>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:name"Prosecutors in the boardroom using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct"
schema:numberOfPages"277"
schema:publisher
rdf:typeschema:Organization
schema:name"New York University Press"
schema:url<http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=865360>
schema:url<http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780814709375/>
schema:url<http://site.ebrary.com/id/10476308>
schema:url<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=368439>
schema:workExample
schema:workExample
schema:workExample
schema:workExample

Content-negotiable representations

Fermer la fenêtre

Veuillez vous identifier dans WorldCat 

Vous n’avez pas de compte? Vous pouvez facilement créer un compte gratuit.