컨텐츠로 이동
Prosecutors in the boardroom : using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct 해당 항목을 미리보기
닫기해당 항목을 미리보기
확인중입니다…

Prosecutors in the boardroom : using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct

저자: Anthony S Barkow; Rachel E Barkow
출판사: New York : New York University Press, ©2011.
판/형식:   전자도서 : 문서 : 영어모든 판과 형식 보기
데이터베이스:WorldCat
요약:
Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is  더 읽기…
평가:

(아무런 평가가 없습니다.) 0 리뷰와 함께 - 첫번째로 올려주세요.

주제
다음과 같습니다:

 

온라인으로 문서 찾기

이 항목에 대한 링크

도서관에서 사본 찾기

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; 해당항목을 보유하고 있는 도서관을 찾는 중

상세정보

장르/형태: Electronic books
추가적인 물리적 형식: Print version:
Prosecutors in the boardroom.
New York : New York University Press, ©2011
(DLC) 2010047467
(OCoLC)682920771
자료 유형: 문서, 인터넷 자료
문서 형식: 인터넷 자원, 컴퓨터 파일
모든 저자 / 참여자: Anthony S Barkow; Rachel E Barkow
ISBN: 9780814709375 0814709370 9780814723142 0814723144
OCLC 번호: 731226490
설명: 1 online resource (x, 277 pages) : illustrations
내용: Introduction / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow --
The causes of corporate crime : an economic perspective / Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen --
Deferred prosecution agreements on trial : lessons from the law of unconstitutional conditions / Richard A. Epstein --
Removing prosecutors from the boardroom : limiting prosecutorial discretion to impose structural reforms / Jennifer Arlen --
Potentially perverse effects of corporate civil liability / Samuel W. Buell --
Inside-out enforcement / Lisa Kern Griffin --
The institutional logic of preventive crime / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar --
Collaborative organizational prosecution / Brandon L. Garrett --
The prosecutor as regulatory agency / Rachel E. Barkow --
What are the rules if everybody wants to play? Multiple federal and state prosecutors (acting) as regulators / Sara Sun Beale --
Reforming the corporate monitor? / Vikramaditya Khanna --
Conclusion / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow.
책임: edited by Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow.

초록:

Analyzes the controversial legal intervention of controlling corporate bodies through outside agencies rather than pressing legal charges  더 읽기…

리뷰

편집자의 리뷰

출판사 줄거리

"Prosecutors in the Boardroom...supplies a wealth of empirical data about contemporary corporate law enforcement policy...[and] demonstrates what happens when well-intentioned, intelligent, dedicated 더 읽기…

 
사용자-기여 리뷰
GoodReads 리뷰 가져오는 중…
DOGObooks 리뷰를 가지고 오는 중…

태그

첫번째 되기
요청하신 것을 확인하기

이 항목을 이미 요청하셨을 수도 있습니다. 만약 이 요청을 계속해서 진행하시려면 Ok을 선택하세요.

링크된 데이터


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/731226490>
library:oclcnum"731226490"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
rdf:typeschema:MediaObject
rdf:typeschema:Book
rdf:valueUnknown value: dct
schema:about
schema:about
<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008101259>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Corporation law--United States--Criminal provisions."@en
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:bookFormatschema:EBook
schema:contributor
schema:contributor
schema:copyrightYear"2011"
schema:datePublished"2011"
schema:description"Introduction / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow -- The causes of corporate crime : an economic perspective / Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen -- Deferred prosecution agreements on trial : lessons from the law of unconstitutional conditions / Richard A. Epstein -- Removing prosecutors from the boardroom : limiting prosecutorial discretion to impose structural reforms / Jennifer Arlen -- Potentially perverse effects of corporate civil liability / Samuel W. Buell -- Inside-out enforcement / Lisa Kern Griffin -- The institutional logic of preventive crime / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar -- Collaborative organizational prosecution / Brandon L. Garrett -- The prosecutor as regulatory agency / Rachel E. Barkow -- What are the rules if everybody wants to play? Multiple federal and state prosecutors (acting) as regulators / Sara Sun Beale -- Reforming the corporate monitor? / Vikramaditya Khanna -- Conclusion / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow."@en
schema:description"Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, a."@en
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/1044669323>
schema:genre"Electronic books"@en
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:name"Prosecutors in the boardroom using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct"@en
schema:publication
schema:publisher
schema:url<http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=865360>
schema:url<http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780814709375/>
schema:url<http://site.ebrary.com/id/10476308>
schema:url<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=368439>
schema:workExample
schema:workExample
wdrs:describedby

Content-negotiable representations

윈도우 닫기

WorldCat에 로그인 하십시오 

계정이 없으세요? 아주 간단한 절차를 통하여 무료 계정을 만드실 수 있습니다.