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Prosecutors in the boardroom : using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct

著者: Anthony S Barkow; Rachel E Barkow
出版商: New York : New York University Press, ©2011.
版本/格式:   电子图书 : 文献 : 英语查看所有的版本和格式
数据库:WorldCat
提要:
Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is  再读一些...
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类型/形式: Electronic books
附加的形体格式: Print version:
Prosecutors in the boardroom.
New York : New York University Press, ©2011
(DLC) 2010047467
(OCoLC)682920771
材料类型: 文献, 互联网资源
文件类型: 互联网资源, 计算机文档
所有的著者/提供者: Anthony S Barkow; Rachel E Barkow
ISBN: 9780814709375 0814709370 9780814723142 0814723144
OCLC号码: 731226490
描述: 1 online resource (x, 277 pages) : illustrations
内容: Introduction / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow --
The causes of corporate crime : an economic perspective / Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen --
Deferred prosecution agreements on trial : lessons from the law of unconstitutional conditions / Richard A. Epstein --
Removing prosecutors from the boardroom : limiting prosecutorial discretion to impose structural reforms / Jennifer Arlen --
Potentially perverse effects of corporate civil liability / Samuel W. Buell --
Inside-out enforcement / Lisa Kern Griffin --
The institutional logic of preventive crime / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar --
Collaborative organizational prosecution / Brandon L. Garrett --
The prosecutor as regulatory agency / Rachel E. Barkow --
What are the rules if everybody wants to play? Multiple federal and state prosecutors (acting) as regulators / Sara Sun Beale --
Reforming the corporate monitor? / Vikramaditya Khanna --
Conclusion / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow.
责任: edited by Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow.

摘要:

Analyzes the controversial legal intervention of controlling corporate bodies through outside agencies rather than pressing legal charges  再读一些...

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"Prosecutors in the Boardroom...supplies a wealth of empirical data about contemporary corporate law enforcement policy...[and] demonstrates what happens when well-intentioned, intelligent, dedicated 再读一些...

 
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