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|All Authors / Contributors:||
Anthony S Barkow; Rachel E Barkow
|Description:||x, 277 p. ; 24 cm|
|Contents:||Acknowledgments Introduction Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow 1 The Causes of Corporate Crime: An Economic Perspective Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen 2 Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law of Unconstitutional Conditions Richard A. Epstein 3 Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms Jennifer Arlen 4 Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability Samuel W. Buell 5 Inside-Out Enforcement Lisa Kern Griffin 6 The Institutional Logic of Preventive Crime Mariano-Florentino Cuellar 7 Collaborative Organizational Prosecution Brandon L. Garrett 8 The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency Rachel E. Barkow 9 What Are the Rules If Everybody Wants to Play? Multiple Federal and State Prosecutors (Acting) as Regulators Sara Sun Beale 10 Reforming the Corporate Monitor? Vikramaditya Khanna Conclusion Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow Contributors Index|
|Responsibility:||edited by Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow.|
"Prosecutors in the Boardroom...supplies a wealth of empirical data about contemporary corporate law enforcement policy...[and] demonstrates what happens when well-intentioned, intelligent, dedicated