skip to content
Quality of bureaucracy and open-economy macro policies Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Quality of bureaucracy and open-economy macro policies

Author: Chong-En Bai; Shang-Jin Wei; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2000.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), working paper no. 7766.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Abstract: Bureaucratic quality in terms of the level of corruption varies widely across countries, and is in general slow to evolve relative to the speed with which many economic polices can be implemented such as the imposition of capital controls. In this paper, we study the possibility that quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open-economy macro-policies, in particular, the  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

 

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Bai, Chong-En.
Quality of bureaucracy and open-economy macro policies.
Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2000
(OCoLC)44681060
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Chong-En Bai; Shang-Jin Wei; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 647035234
Reproduction Notes: Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. MiAaHDL
Description: 1 online resource (34 pages).
Details: Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), working paper no. 7766.
Responsibility: Chong-En Bai, Shang-Jin Wei.

Abstract:

Abstract: Bureaucratic quality in terms of the level of corruption varies widely across countries, and is in general slow to evolve relative to the speed with which many economic polices can be implemented such as the imposition of capital controls. In this paper, we study the possibility that quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open-economy macro-policies, in particular, the imposition/removal of capital controls, and financial repression. We first derive a model that delivers such a result. Bureaucratic corruption translates into reduced ability by the government to collect tax revenue. Even if capital control/financial repression is otherwise inefficient, as long as the government needs the revenue for public goods provision, it would have to rely more on capital control/financial repression. For all countries for which we can obtain relevant data, we find that more corrupt countries are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. The result of this paper suggests that a premature removal of capital controls mandated by outside institutions could reduce rather than enhance economic efficiency.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/647035234> # Quality of bureaucracy and open-economy macro policies
    a schema:CreativeWork, schema:Book, schema:MediaObject ;
   library:oclcnum "647035234" ;
   library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
   library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Place/cambridge_ma> ; # Cambridge, MA
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/796777> ; # Administrative agencies--Management
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Topic/capital_market_state_supervision_corrupt_practices> ; # Capital market--State supervision--Corrupt practices
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Topic/capital_movements_government_policy_corrupt_practices> ; # Capital movements--Government policy--Corrupt practices
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/945463> ; # Government productivity
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Topic/institution_building_economic_aspects> ; # Institution building--Economic aspects
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Topic/finance_deregulation> ; # Finance--Deregulation
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Topic/bureaucracy_corrupt_practices> ; # Bureaucracy--Corrupt practices
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/846358> ; # Capital market--Deregulation
   schema:about <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85056092> ; # Government productivity
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/924374> ; # Finance--Deregulation
   schema:about <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85000902> ; # Administrative agencies--Management
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Topic/financial_institutions_state_supervision_corrupt_practices> ; # Financial institutions--State supervision--Corrupt practices
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Topic/capital_market_deregulation> ; # Capital market--Deregulation
   schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
   schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/135446122> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research.
   schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/66626764> ; # Shang-Jin Wei
   schema:copyrightYear "2000" ;
   schema:creator <http://viaf.org/viaf/15941671> ; # Chong-En Bai
   schema:datePublished "2000" ;
   schema:description "Abstract: Bureaucratic quality in terms of the level of corruption varies widely across countries, and is in general slow to evolve relative to the speed with which many economic polices can be implemented such as the imposition of capital controls. In this paper, we study the possibility that quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open-economy macro-policies, in particular, the imposition/removal of capital controls, and financial repression. We first derive a model that delivers such a result. Bureaucratic corruption translates into reduced ability by the government to collect tax revenue. Even if capital control/financial repression is otherwise inefficient, as long as the government needs the revenue for public goods provision, it would have to rely more on capital control/financial repression. For all countries for which we can obtain relevant data, we find that more corrupt countries are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. The result of this paper suggests that a premature removal of capital controls mandated by outside institutions could reduce rather than enhance economic efficiency."@en ;
   schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/20775089> ;
   schema:inLanguage "en" ;
   schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
   schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
   schema:isSimilarTo <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/44681060> ;
   schema:name "Quality of bureaucracy and open-economy macro policies"@en ;
   schema:productID "647035234" ;
   schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/647035234#PublicationEvent/cambridge_ma_national_bureau_of_economic_research_2000> ;
   schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research
   schema:url <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/44681060.html> ;
   schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7766> ;
   wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/647035234> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research
    a bgn:Agent ;
   schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
   schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/647035234> ; # Quality of bureaucracy and open-economy macro policies
   schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
   schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/647035234> ; # Quality of bureaucracy and open-economy macro policies
   schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Topic/capital_market_state_supervision_corrupt_practices> # Capital market--State supervision--Corrupt practices
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85019945> ;
   schema:name "Capital market--State supervision--Corrupt practices"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Topic/capital_movements_government_policy_corrupt_practices> # Capital movements--Government policy--Corrupt practices
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85019946> ;
   schema:name "Capital movements--Government policy--Corrupt practices"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/20775089#Topic/financial_institutions_state_supervision_corrupt_practices> # Financial institutions--State supervision--Corrupt practices
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009124335> ;
   schema:name "Financial institutions--State supervision--Corrupt practices"@en ;
    .

<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85000902> # Administrative agencies--Management
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Administrative agencies--Management"@en ;
    .

<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85056092> # Government productivity
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Government productivity"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/796777> # Administrative agencies--Management
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:hasPart <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85000902> ; # Administrative agencies--Management
   schema:name "Administrative agencies--Management"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/846358> # Capital market--Deregulation
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Capital market--Deregulation"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/924374> # Finance--Deregulation
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Finance--Deregulation"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/945463> # Government productivity
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Government productivity"@en ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/135446122> # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    a schema:Organization ;
   schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research." ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/15941671> # Chong-En Bai
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:familyName "Bai" ;
   schema:givenName "Chong-En" ;
   schema:name "Chong-En Bai" ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/66626764> # Shang-Jin Wei
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:familyName "Wei" ;
   schema:givenName "Shang-Jin" ;
   schema:name "Shang-Jin Wei" ;
    .

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/44681060>
    a schema:CreativeWork ;
   rdfs:label "Quality of bureaucracy and open-economy macro policies." ;
   schema:description "Print version:" ;
   schema:isSimilarTo <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/647035234> ; # Quality of bureaucracy and open-economy macro policies
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.