RT Book, Whole DB /z-wcorg/ DS http://worldcat.org ID 723529703 LA English T1 Reagan on war : a reappraisal of the Weinberger doctrine, 1980-1984 A1 Yoshitani, Gail E. S.,, PB Texas A & M University Press PP College Station YR 2012 SN 9781603442596 1603442596 AB Even when it was announced near the end of first term of the Reagan administration, such luminaries as William Safire mischaracterized the Weinberger Doctrine as a conservative retreat from the use of force in U.S. international relations. Since then, scholars have largely agreed with Safire that six points spelled out in the statement represented a reaction to the Vietnam War and were intended to limit U.S. military action to "only the fun wars" that could be relatively easily won or those in response to direct attack. In this work historian Gail Yoshitani argues that Weinberger Doctrine was intended to legitimize use of military force as a tool of statecraft, rather than to reserve force for a last resort after other instruments of power have failed. This understanding sheds clearer light on recent foreign policy decisions, as well as on the formulation and adoption of the original doctrine. With permission of family of former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Yoshitani gained access to Weinberger's papers at Library of Congress. She is first scholar granted access to General (ret.) John Vessey's archive at the Library. Yoshitani uses three case studies from Reagan administration's first term in office - Central America and two deployments in Lebanon - to analyze how the administration grappled with using military force in pursuit of national interests. The administration codified lessons it learned during its first term in the Weinberger Doctrine promulgated by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in a speech on November 28, 1984, two weeks after Reagan won reelection. Yoshitani considers Weinberger Doctrine's six tests to be applied when considering the use of military force as a tool of statecraft. Just as the Reagan administration was forced to dance an intricate step in early 1980s as it sought to use force as a routine part of statecraft, current and future administrations face similar challenges. Yoshitani's analysis facilitates a better understanding of the Doctrine and how it might be applied by American national security managers today.