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Reagan on war : a reappraisal of the Weinberger doctrine, 1980-1984

Auteur : Gail E S Yoshitani
Éditeur : College Station : Texas A&M University Press, ©2012.
Collection : Foreign relations and the presidency, no. 10.
Édition/format :   Livre : Anglais : 1st edVoir toutes les éditions et les formats
Base de données :WorldCat
Résumé :
Even when it was announced near the end of first term of the Reagan administration, such luminaries as William Safire mischaracterized the Weinberger Doctrine as a conservative retreat from the use of force in U.S. international relations. Since then, scholars have largely agreed with Safire that six points spelled out in the statement represented a reaction to the Vietnam War and were intended to limit U.S.  Lire la suite...
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Détails

Personne nommée : Caspar W Weinberger; Ronald Reagan; Ronald Reagan; Caspar W Weinberger
Type d’ouvrage : Ressource Internet
Format : Livre, Ressource Internet
Tous les auteurs / collaborateurs : Gail E S Yoshitani
ISBN : 9781603442596 1603442596 9781603445771 1603445773
Numéro OCLC : 723529703
Description : xvii, 250 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Contenu : Defining and challenging the Vietnam syndrome --
A short primer on domestic political realities --
The Casey doctrine: using proxy forces in Central America --
The Pentagon doctrine: using American military power decisively in Lebanon --
The Shultz doctrine: using American military power to support diplomacy --
The Weinberger doctrine: a new pattern for civil-military relations.
Titre de collection : Foreign relations and the presidency, no. 10.
Responsabilité : Gail E.S. Yoshitani.

Résumé :

Even when it was announced near the end of first term of the Reagan administration, such luminaries as William Safire mischaracterized the Weinberger Doctrine as a conservative retreat from the use of force in U.S. international relations. Since then, scholars have largely agreed with Safire that six points spelled out in the statement represented a reaction to the Vietnam War and were intended to limit U.S. military action to "only the fun wars" that could be relatively easily won or those in response to direct attack. In this work historian Gail Yoshitani argues that Weinberger Doctrine was intended to legitimize use of military force as a tool of statecraft, rather than to reserve force for a last resort after other instruments of power have failed. This understanding sheds clearer light on recent foreign policy decisions, as well as on the formulation and adoption of the original doctrine. With permission of family of former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Yoshitani gained access to Weinberger's papers at Library of Congress. She is first scholar granted access to General (ret.) John Vessey's archive at the Library. Yoshitani uses three case studies from Reagan administration's first term in office - Central America and two deployments in Lebanon - to analyze how the administration grappled with using military force in pursuit of national interests. The administration codified lessons it learned during its first term in the Weinberger Doctrine promulgated by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in a speech on November 28, 1984, two weeks after Reagan won reelection. Yoshitani considers Weinberger Doctrine's six tests to be applied when considering the use of military force as a tool of statecraft. Just as the Reagan administration was forced to dance an intricate step in early 1980s as it sought to use force as a routine part of statecraft, current and future administrations face similar challenges. Yoshitani's analysis facilitates a better understanding of the Doctrine and how it might be applied by American national security managers today.

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Données liées


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