pular para conteúdo
The rediscovery of the mind Ver prévia deste item
FecharVer prévia deste item
Checando...

The rediscovery of the mind

Autor: John R Searle
Editora: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©1992.
Séries: Representation and mind.
Edição/Formato   Livro : InglêsVer todas as edições e formatos
Base de Dados:WorldCat
Resumo:
In this major new work, John Searle launches a formidable attack on current orthodoxies in the philosophy of mind. More than anything else, he argues, it is the neglect of consciousness that results in so much barrenness and sterility in psychology, the philosophy of mind, and cognitive science: there can be no study of mind that leaves out consciousness. What is going on in the brain is neurophysiological processes  Ler mais...
Classificação:

baseado em 1 classificação(ões) 0 com críticas - Seja o primeiro.

Assuntos
Mais como este

 

Encontrar uma cópia on-line

Links para este item

Encontrar uma cópia na biblioteca

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Encontrando bibliotecas que possuem este item...

Detalhes

Tipo de Material: Recurso Internet
Tipo de Documento: Livro, Recurso Internet
Todos os Autores / Contribuintes: John R Searle
ISBN: 0262193213 9780262193214 026269154X 9780262691543
Número OCLC: 25675689
Notas: "A Bradford book."
Descrição: xv, 270 p. ; 24 cm.
Conteúdos: What's wrong with the philosophy of mind --
The recent history of materialism: the same mistake over and over --
Breaking the hold: silicon brains, conscious robots, and other minds --
Consciousness and its place in nature --
Reductionism and the irreducibility of consciousness --
The structure of consciousness: an introduction --
The unconscious and its relation to consciousness --
Consciousness, intentionality, and the background --
The critique of cognitive reason.
Título da Série: Representation and mind.
Responsabilidade: John R. Searle.

Resumo:

In this major new work, John Searle launches a formidable attack on current orthodoxies in the philosophy of mind. More than anything else, he argues, it is the neglect of consciousness that results in so much barrenness and sterility in psychology, the philosophy of mind, and cognitive science: there can be no study of mind that leaves out consciousness. What is going on in the brain is neurophysiological processes and consciousness and nothing more--no rule following, no mental information processing or mental models, no language of thought, and no universal grammar. Mental events are themselves features of the brain, in the same way that liquidity is a feature of water. Beginning with a spirited discussion of what's wrong with the philosophy of mind, Searle characterizes and refutes the philosophical tradition of materialism. But he does not embrace dualism. All these "isms" are mistaken, he insists. Once you start counting types of phenomena, you are on the wrong track, whether you stop at one or two. In four chapters that constitute the heart of his argument, Searle elaborates a theory of consciousness and its relation to our overall scientific world view and to unconscious mental phenomena. He concludes with a criticism of cognitive science and proposes an approach to the study of mind that emphasizes the centrality of consciousness. In his characteristically direct style, punctuated with persuasive examples, Searle identifies the vary terminology of the field as a main source of trouble. He observes that it is a mistake to suppose that the ontology of the mental is objective and that the methodology of a science of the mind must concern itself only with objectively observable behavior; that it is also a mistake to suppose that we know of the existence of mental phenomena in others only by observing their behavior; that behavior or causal relations to behavior are not essential to the existence of mental phenomena; and that it is inconsistent with what we know about the universe and our place in it to suppose that everything is knowable by us.

Críticas

Críticas contribuídas por usuários
Recuperando críticas GoodReas...
Recuperando comentários DOGObooks

Etiquetas

Seja o primeiro.
Confirmar esta solicitação

Você já pode ter solicitado este item. Por favor, selecione Ok se gostaria de proceder com esta solicitação de qualquer forma.

Dados Ligados


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/25675689>
library:oclcnum"25675689"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
owl:sameAs<info:oclcnum/25675689>
rdf:typeschema:Book
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/875441>
rdf:typeschema:Intangible
schema:name"Identité de l'esprit et du cerveau, Théorie de l'."@en
schema:name"Consciousness"@en
schema:about
schema:about
schema:copyrightYear"1992"
schema:creator
schema:datePublished"1992"
schema:description"What's wrong with the philosophy of mind -- The recent history of materialism: the same mistake over and over -- Breaking the hold: silicon brains, conscious robots, and other minds -- Consciousness and its place in nature -- Reductionism and the irreducibility of consciousness -- The structure of consciousness: an introduction -- The unconscious and its relation to consciousness -- Consciousness, intentionality, and the background -- The critique of cognitive reason."@en
schema:description"In this major new work, John Searle launches a formidable attack on current orthodoxies in the philosophy of mind. More than anything else, he argues, it is the neglect of consciousness that results in so much barrenness and sterility in psychology, the philosophy of mind, and cognitive science: there can be no study of mind that leaves out consciousness. What is going on in the brain is neurophysiological processes and consciousness and nothing more--no rule following, no mental information processing or mental models, no language of thought, and no universal grammar. Mental events are themselves features of the brain, in the same way that liquidity is a feature of water. Beginning with a spirited discussion of what's wrong with the philosophy of mind, Searle characterizes and refutes the philosophical tradition of materialism. But he does not embrace dualism. All these "isms" are mistaken, he insists. Once you start counting types of phenomena, you are on the wrong track, whether you stop at one or two. In four chapters that constitute the heart of his argument, Searle elaborates a theory of consciousness and its relation to our overall scientific world view and to unconscious mental phenomena. He concludes with a criticism of cognitive science and proposes an approach to the study of mind that emphasizes the centrality of consciousness. In his characteristically direct style, punctuated with persuasive examples, Searle identifies the vary terminology of the field as a main source of trouble. He observes that it is a mistake to suppose that the ontology of the mental is objective and that the methodology of a science of the mind must concern itself only with objectively observable behavior; that it is also a mistake to suppose that we know of the existence of mental phenomena in others only by observing their behavior; that behavior or causal relations to behavior are not essential to the existence of mental phenomena; and that it is inconsistent with what we know about the universe and our place in it to suppose that everything is knowable by us."@en
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/6301866>
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:name"The rediscovery of the mind"@en
schema:numberOfPages"270"
schema:publisher
schema:url
schema:workExample
schema:workExample

Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Por favor, conecte-se ao WorldCat 

Não tem uma conta? Você pode facilmente criar uma conta gratuita.