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The rediscovery of the mind

作者: John R Searle
出版商: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©1992.
叢書: Representation and mind.
版本/格式:   圖書 : 英語所有版本和格式的總覽
資料庫:WorldCat
提要:
In this major new work, John Searle launches a formidable attack on current orthodoxies in the philosophy of mind. More than anything else, he argues, it is the neglect of consciousness that results in so much barrenness and sterility in psychology, the philosophy of mind, and cognitive science: there can be no study of mind that leaves out consciousness. What is going on in the brain is neurophysiological processes  再讀一些...
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資料類型: 網際網路資源
文件類型: 圖書, 網路資源
所有的作者/貢獻者: John R Searle
ISBN: 0262193213 9780262193214 026269154X 9780262691543
OCLC系統控制編碼: 25675689
注意: "A Bradford book."
描述: xv, 270 p. ; 24 cm.
内容: What's wrong with the philosophy of mind --
The recent history of materialism: the same mistake over and over --
Breaking the hold: silicon brains, conscious robots, and other minds --
Consciousness and its place in nature --
Reductionism and the irreducibility of consciousness --
The structure of consciousness: an introduction --
The unconscious and its relation to consciousness --
Consciousness, intentionality, and the background --
The critique of cognitive reason.
叢書名: Representation and mind.
責任: John R. Searle.

摘要:

In this major new work, John Searle launches a formidable attack on current orthodoxies in the philosophy of mind. More than anything else, he argues, it is the neglect of consciousness that results in so much barrenness and sterility in psychology, the philosophy of mind, and cognitive science: there can be no study of mind that leaves out consciousness. What is going on in the brain is neurophysiological processes and consciousness and nothing more--no rule following, no mental information processing or mental models, no language of thought, and no universal grammar. Mental events are themselves features of the brain, in the same way that liquidity is a feature of water. Beginning with a spirited discussion of what's wrong with the philosophy of mind, Searle characterizes and refutes the philosophical tradition of materialism. But he does not embrace dualism. All these "isms" are mistaken, he insists. Once you start counting types of phenomena, you are on the wrong track, whether you stop at one or two. In four chapters that constitute the heart of his argument, Searle elaborates a theory of consciousness and its relation to our overall scientific world view and to unconscious mental phenomena. He concludes with a criticism of cognitive science and proposes an approach to the study of mind that emphasizes the centrality of consciousness. In his characteristically direct style, punctuated with persuasive examples, Searle identifies the vary terminology of the field as a main source of trouble. He observes that it is a mistake to suppose that the ontology of the mental is objective and that the methodology of a science of the mind must concern itself only with objectively observable behavior; that it is also a mistake to suppose that we know of the existence of mental phenomena in others only by observing their behavior; that behavior or causal relations to behavior are not essential to the existence of mental phenomena; and that it is inconsistent with what we know about the universe and our place in it to suppose that everything is knowable by us.

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