přejít na obsah
Rethinking insurgency Náhled dokumentu
ZavřítNáhled dokumentu
Probíhá kontrola...

Rethinking insurgency

Autor Steven Metz; Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute.
Vydavatel: [Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007]
Vydání/formát:   e-kniha : Document : National government publication : EnglishZobrazit všechny vydání a formáty
Databáze:WorldCat
Shrnutí:
The September 11, 2001, attacks and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom revived the idea that insurgency is a significant threat to the United States. In response, the American military and defense communities began to rethink insurgency. Much of this valuable work, though, viewed contemporary insurgency as more closely related to Cold War era insurgencies than to the complex conflicts which characterized  Přečíst více...
Hodnocení:

(ještě nehodnoceno) 0 zobrazit recenze - Buďte první.

Předmětová hesla:
Více podobných

 

Najít online exemplář

Odkazy na tento dokument

Vyhledat exemplář v knihovně

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Vyhledávání knihoven, které vlastní tento dokument...

Detaily

Žánr/forma: History
Doplňující formát: Metz, Steven.
Rethinking insurgency
vii, 69 p.
(OCoLC)150556399
Typ materiálu: Document, Government publication, National government publication, Internetový zdroj
Typ dokumentu: Internet Resource, Computer File
Všichni autoři/tvůrci: Steven Metz; Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute.
ISBN: 1584872977 9781584872979
OCLC číslo: 140031792
Poznámky: Title from title screen (viewed on June 15, 2007).
"June 2007."
Popis: vii, 69 p. : digital, PDF file.
Podrobnosti: System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.; Mode of access: Internet from the STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE web site. Address as of 6/15/2007: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB790.pdf; current access is available via PURL.
Odpovědnost: Steven Metz.

Anotace:

The September 11, 2001, attacks and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom revived the idea that insurgency is a significant threat to the United States. In response, the American military and defense communities began to rethink insurgency. Much of this valuable work, though, viewed contemporary insurgency as more closely related to Cold War era insurgencies than to the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War period. This suggests that the most basic way that the military and defense communities think about insurgency must be rethought. Contemporary insurgency has a different strategic context, structure, and dynamics than its forebears. Insurgencies tend to be nested in complex conflicts which involve what can be called third forces (armed groups which affect the outcome, such as militias) and fourth forces (unarmed groups which affect the outcome, such as international media), as well as the insurgents and the regime. Because of globalization, the decline of overt state sponsorship of insurgency, the continuing importance of informal outside sponsorship, and the nesting of insurgency within complex conflicts associated with state weakness or failure, the dynamics of contemporary insurgency are more like a violent and competitive market than war in the traditional sense where clear and discrete combatants seek strategic victory. This suggests a very different way of thinking about (and undertaking) counterinsurgency. At the strategic level, the risk to the United States is not that insurgents will "win" in the traditional sense, take over their country, and shift it from a partner to an enemy. It is that complex internal conflicts, especially ones involving insurgency, will generate other adverse effects: the destabilization of regions, resource flows, and markets; the blossoming of transnational crime; humanitarian disasters; transnational terrorism; and so forth. Given this, the U.S. goal should not automatically be the defeat of the insurgents by the regime (which may be impossible and which the regime may not even want), but the most rapid conflict resolution possible. In other words, a quick and sustainable resolution which integrates insurgents into the national power structure is less damaging to U.S. national interests than a protracted conflict which leads to the complete destruction of insurgents. Protracted conflict, not insurgent victory, is the threat. If, in fact, insurgency is not simply a variant of war, if the real threat is the deleterious effects of sustained conflict, and if it is part of systemic failure and pathology in which key elites and organizations develop a vested interest in sustaining the conflict, the objective of counterinsurgency support should not be simply strengthening the government so that it can impose its will more effectively on the insurgents, but systemic reengineering. This, in turn, implies that the most effective posture for outsiders is not to be an ally of the government and thus a sustainer of the flawed socio-political-economic system, but to be neutral mediators and peacekeepers (even when the outsiders have much more ideological affinity for the regime than for the insurgents). If this is true, the United States should only undertake counterinsurgency support in the most pressing instances and as part of an equitable, legitimate, and broad-based multinational coalition.

Recenze

Recenze vložené uživatelem
Nahrávání recenzí GoodReads...
Přebírání recenzí DOGO books...

Štítky

Štítky všech uživatelů (2)

Zobrazit nejoblíbenější štítky jako: seznam štítků | tag cloud

Podobné dokumenty

Související předmětová hesla:(9)

Seznamy uživatele s tímto dokumentem (3)

Potvrdit tento požadavek

Tento dokument jste si již vyžádali. Prosím vyberte Ok pokud chcete přesto v žádance pokračovat.

Propojená data


<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/140031792>
library:oclcnum"140031792"
library:placeOfPublication
library:placeOfPublication
rdf:typeschema:MediaObject
rdf:typeschema:Book
rdf:valueUnknown value: gpb
rdf:valueUnknown value: dct
rdf:valueUnknown value: ngp
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:about
schema:bookFormatschema:EBook
schema:contributor
<http://viaf.org/viaf/150730355>
rdf:typeschema:Organization
schema:name"Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute."
schema:creator
schema:datePublished"2007"
schema:description"The September 11, 2001, attacks and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom revived the idea that insurgency is a significant threat to the United States. In response, the American military and defense communities began to rethink insurgency. Much of this valuable work, though, viewed contemporary insurgency as more closely related to Cold War era insurgencies than to the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War period. This suggests that the most basic way that the military and defense communities think about insurgency must be rethought. Contemporary insurgency has a different strategic context, structure, and dynamics than its forebears. Insurgencies tend to be nested in complex conflicts which involve what can be called third forces (armed groups which affect the outcome, such as militias) and fourth forces (unarmed groups which affect the outcome, such as international media), as well as the insurgents and the regime. Because of globalization, the decline of overt state sponsorship of insurgency, the continuing importance of informal outside sponsorship, and the nesting of insurgency within complex conflicts associated with state weakness or failure, the dynamics of contemporary insurgency are more like a violent and competitive market than war in the traditional sense where clear and discrete combatants seek strategic victory. This suggests a very different way of thinking about (and undertaking) counterinsurgency. At the strategic level, the risk to the United States is not that insurgents will "win" in the traditional sense, take over their country, and shift it from a partner to an enemy. It is that complex internal conflicts, especially ones involving insurgency, will generate other adverse effects: the destabilization of regions, resource flows, and markets; the blossoming of transnational crime; humanitarian disasters; transnational terrorism; and so forth. Given this, the U.S. goal should not automatically be the defeat of the insurgents by the regime (which may be impossible and which the regime may not even want), but the most rapid conflict resolution possible. In other words, a quick and sustainable resolution which integrates insurgents into the national power structure is less damaging to U.S. national interests than a protracted conflict which leads to the complete destruction of insurgents. Protracted conflict, not insurgent victory, is the threat. If, in fact, insurgency is not simply a variant of war, if the real threat is the deleterious effects of sustained conflict, and if it is part of systemic failure and pathology in which key elites and organizations develop a vested interest in sustaining the conflict, the objective of counterinsurgency support should not be simply strengthening the government so that it can impose its will more effectively on the insurgents, but systemic reengineering. This, in turn, implies that the most effective posture for outsiders is not to be an ally of the government and thus a sustainer of the flawed socio-political-economic system, but to be neutral mediators and peacekeepers (even when the outsiders have much more ideological affinity for the regime than for the insurgents). If this is true, the United States should only undertake counterinsurgency support in the most pressing instances and as part of an equitable, legitimate, and broad-based multinational coalition."
schema:exampleOfWork<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/2094440670>
schema:genre"History"
schema:inLanguage"en"
schema:name"Rethinking insurgency"
schema:numberOfPages"69"
schema:publication
schema:publisher
schema:url<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS82577>
schema:workExample
wdrs:describedby

Content-negotiable representations

Zavřít okno

Prosím přihlaste se do WorldCat 

Nemáte účet? Můžete si jednoduše vytvořit bezplatný účet.