omitir hasta el contenido
Rethinking insurgency Ver este material de antemano
CerrarVer este material de antemano
Chequeando…

Rethinking insurgency

Autor: Steven Metz; Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute.
Editorial: [Carlisle, PA] : [Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College], [2007]
Edición/Formato:   Libro-e : Documento : Publicación gubernamental nacional : Inglés (eng)Ver todas las ediciones y todos los formatos
Base de datos:WorldCat
Resumen:
The September 11, 2001, attacks and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom revived the idea that insurgency is a significant threat to the United States. In response, the American military and defense communities began to rethink insurgency. Much of this valuable work, though, viewed contemporary insurgency as more closely related to Cold War era insurgencies than to the complex conflicts which characterized  Leer más
Calificación:

(todavía no calificado) 0 con reseñas - Ser el primero.

Temas
Más materiales como éste

 

Encontrar un ejemplar en línea

Enlaces a este material

Encontrar un ejemplar en la biblioteca

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Encontrando bibliotecas que tienen este material…

Detalles

Género/Forma: History
Formato físico adicional: Metz, Steven.
Rethinking insurgency
vii, 69 p.
(OCoLC)150556399
Tipo de material: Documento, Publicación gubernamental, Publicación gubernamental nacional, Recurso en Internet
Tipo de documento: Recurso en Internet, Archivo de computadora
Todos autores / colaboradores: Steven Metz; Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute.
ISBN: 1584872977 9781584872979
Número OCLC: 140031792
Notas: Title from title screen (viewed on June 15, 2007).
"June 2007."
Descripción: vii, 69 pages : digital, PDF file
Detalles: System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.; Mode of access: Internet from the STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE web site. Address as of 6/15/2007: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB790.pdf; current access is available via PURL.
Responsabilidad: Steven Metz.

Resumen:

The September 11, 2001, attacks and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom revived the idea that insurgency is a significant threat to the United States. In response, the American military and defense communities began to rethink insurgency. Much of this valuable work, though, viewed contemporary insurgency as more closely related to Cold War era insurgencies than to the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War period. This suggests that the most basic way that the military and defense communities think about insurgency must be rethought. Contemporary insurgency has a different strategic context, structure, and dynamics than its forebears. Insurgencies tend to be nested in complex conflicts which involve what can be called third forces (armed groups which affect the outcome, such as militias) and fourth forces (unarmed groups which affect the outcome, such as international media), as well as the insurgents and the regime. Because of globalization, the decline of overt state sponsorship of insurgency, the continuing importance of informal outside sponsorship, and the nesting of insurgency within complex conflicts associated with state weakness or failure, the dynamics of contemporary insurgency are more like a violent and competitive market than war in the traditional sense where clear and discrete combatants seek strategic victory. This suggests a very different way of thinking about (and undertaking) counterinsurgency. At the strategic level, the risk to the United States is not that insurgents will "win" in the traditional sense, take over their country, and shift it from a partner to an enemy. It is that complex internal conflicts, especially ones involving insurgency, will generate other adverse effects: the destabilization of regions, resource flows, and markets; the blossoming of transnational crime; humanitarian disasters; transnational terrorism; and so forth. Given this, the U.S. goal should not automatically be the defeat of the insurgents by the regime (which may be impossible and which the regime may not even want), but the most rapid conflict resolution possible. In other words, a quick and sustainable resolution which integrates insurgents into the national power structure is less damaging to U.S. national interests than a protracted conflict which leads to the complete destruction of insurgents. Protracted conflict, not insurgent victory, is the threat. If, in fact, insurgency is not simply a variant of war, if the real threat is the deleterious effects of sustained conflict, and if it is part of systemic failure and pathology in which key elites and organizations develop a vested interest in sustaining the conflict, the objective of counterinsurgency support should not be simply strengthening the government so that it can impose its will more effectively on the insurgents, but systemic reengineering. This, in turn, implies that the most effective posture for outsiders is not to be an ally of the government and thus a sustainer of the flawed socio-political-economic system, but to be neutral mediators and peacekeepers (even when the outsiders have much more ideological affinity for the regime than for the insurgents). If this is true, the United States should only undertake counterinsurgency support in the most pressing instances and as part of an equitable, legitimate, and broad-based multinational coalition.

Reseñas

Reseñas contribuidas por usuarios
Recuperando reseñas de GoodReads…
Recuperando reseñas de DOGObooks…

Etiquetas

Todas las etiquetas de usuarios (2)

Ver etiquetas más populares como: lista de etiquetas | nube de etiquetas

Materiales similares

Confirmar este pedido

Ya ha pedido este material. Escoja OK si desea procesar el pedido de todos modos.

Datos enlazados


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/140031792> # Rethinking insurgency
    a schema:CreativeWork, schema:MediaObject, schema:Book ;
   library:oclcnum "140031792" ;
   library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/pau> ;
   library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/103124508#Place/carlisle_pa> ; # Carlisle, PA
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1205757> ; # Iraq.
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/881325> ; # Counterinsurgency
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/103124508#Place/united_states> ; # United States
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1204155> ; # United States.
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1020874> ; # Military art and science
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1021386> ; # Military policy
   schema:about <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2010101774> ; # Military art and science--History--21st century
   schema:about <http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008123892> ; # Insurgency--Iraq
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/103124508#Event/2000_2099> ; # 2000-2099
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/975461> ; # Insurgency
   schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
   schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/150730355> ; # Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute.
   schema:creator <http://viaf.org/viaf/40854158> ; # Steven Metz
   schema:datePublished "2007" ;
   schema:description "The September 11, 2001, attacks and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom revived the idea that insurgency is a significant threat to the United States. In response, the American military and defense communities began to rethink insurgency. Much of this valuable work, though, viewed contemporary insurgency as more closely related to Cold War era insurgencies than to the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War period. This suggests that the most basic way that the military and defense communities think about insurgency must be rethought. Contemporary insurgency has a different strategic context, structure, and dynamics than its forebears. Insurgencies tend to be nested in complex conflicts which involve what can be called third forces (armed groups which affect the outcome, such as militias) and fourth forces (unarmed groups which affect the outcome, such as international media), as well as the insurgents and the regime. Because of globalization, the decline of overt state sponsorship of insurgency, the continuing importance of informal outside sponsorship, and the nesting of insurgency within complex conflicts associated with state weakness or failure, the dynamics of contemporary insurgency are more like a violent and competitive market than war in the traditional sense where clear and discrete combatants seek strategic victory. This suggests a very different way of thinking about (and undertaking) counterinsurgency. At the strategic level, the risk to the United States is not that insurgents will "win" in the traditional sense, take over their country, and shift it from a partner to an enemy. It is that complex internal conflicts, especially ones involving insurgency, will generate other adverse effects: the destabilization of regions, resource flows, and markets; the blossoming of transnational crime; humanitarian disasters; transnational terrorism; and so forth. Given this, the U.S. goal should not automatically be the defeat of the insurgents by the regime (which may be impossible and which the regime may not even want), but the most rapid conflict resolution possible. In other words, a quick and sustainable resolution which integrates insurgents into the national power structure is less damaging to U.S. national interests than a protracted conflict which leads to the complete destruction of insurgents. Protracted conflict, not insurgent victory, is the threat. If, in fact, insurgency is not simply a variant of war, if the real threat is the deleterious effects of sustained conflict, and if it is part of systemic failure and pathology in which key elites and organizations develop a vested interest in sustaining the conflict, the objective of counterinsurgency support should not be simply strengthening the government so that it can impose its will more effectively on the insurgents, but systemic reengineering. This, in turn, implies that the most effective posture for outsiders is not to be an ally of the government and thus a sustainer of the flawed socio-political-economic system, but to be neutral mediators and peacekeepers (even when the outsiders have much more ideological affinity for the regime than for the insurgents). If this is true, the United States should only undertake counterinsurgency support in the most pressing instances and as part of an equitable, legitimate, and broad-based multinational coalition."@en ;
   schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/103124508> ;
   schema:genre "Government publication"@en ;
   schema:genre "National government publication"@en ;
   schema:genre "History"@en ;
   schema:inLanguage "en" ;
   schema:isSimilarTo <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/150556399> ;
   schema:name "Rethinking insurgency"@en ;
   schema:productID "140031792" ;
   schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/140031792#PublicationEvent/carlisle_pa_strategic_studies_institute_u_s_army_war_college_2007> ;
   schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/103124508#Agent/strategic_studies_institute_u_s_army_war_college> ; # [Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College]
   schema:url <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS82577> ;
   schema:workExample <http://worldcat.org/isbn/9781584872979> ;
   wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/140031792> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/103124508#Agent/strategic_studies_institute_u_s_army_war_college> # [Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College]
    a bgn:Agent ;
   schema:name "[Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College]" ;
    .

<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008123892> # Insurgency--Iraq
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Insurgency--Iraq"@en ;
    .

<http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2010101774> # Military art and science--History--21st century
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Military art and science--History--21st century"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1020874> # Military art and science
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Military art and science"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1021386> # Military policy
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Military policy"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1204155> # United States.
    a schema:Place ;
   schema:name "United States." ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1205757> # Iraq.
    a schema:Place ;
   schema:name "Iraq." ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/881325> # Counterinsurgency
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Counterinsurgency"@en ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/975461> # Insurgency
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Insurgency"@en ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/150730355> # Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute.
    a schema:Organization ;
   schema:name "Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute." ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/40854158> # Steven Metz
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:birthDate "1956" ;
   schema:familyName "Metz" ;
   schema:givenName "Steven" ;
   schema:name "Steven Metz" ;
    .

<http://worldcat.org/isbn/9781584872979>
    a schema:ProductModel ;
   schema:isbn "1584872977" ;
   schema:isbn "9781584872979" ;
    .

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/150556399>
    a schema:CreativeWork ;
   rdfs:label "Rethinking insurgency" ;
   schema:isSimilarTo <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/140031792> ; # Rethinking insurgency
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Cerrar ventana

Inicie una sesión con WorldCat 

¿No tienes una cuenta? Puede fácilmente crear una cuenta gratuita.