skip to content
Revisiting the classical view of benefit-based taxation Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Revisiting the classical view of benefit-based taxation

Author: Matthew Weinzierl; National Bureau of Economic Research,
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 20735.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
This paper explores how the persistently popular "classical" logic of benefit-based taxation, in which an individual's benefit from public goods is tied to his or her income-earning ability, can be incorporated into modern optimal tax theory. If Lindahl's methods are applied to that view of benefits, first-best optimal policy can be characterized analytically as depending on a few potentially estimable statistics,  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

 

Find a copy online

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Matthew Weinzierl; National Bureau of Economic Research,
OCLC Number: 900199930
Notes: "December 2014"
Description: 1 online resource (31 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 20735.
Responsibility: Matthew Weinzierl.

Abstract:

This paper explores how the persistently popular "classical" logic of benefit-based taxation, in which an individual's benefit from public goods is tied to his or her income-earning ability, can be incorporated into modern optimal tax theory. If Lindahl's methods are applied to that view of benefits, first-best optimal policy can be characterized analytically as depending on a few potentially estimable statistics, in particular the coefficient of complementarity between public goods and innate talent. Constrained optimal policy with a Pareto-efficient objective that strikes a balance--controlled by a single parameter--between this principle and the familiar utilitarian criterion can be simulated using conventional constraints and methods. A wide range of optimal policy outcomes can result, including those that match well several features of existing policies. To the extent that such an objective reflects the mixed normative reasoning behind prevailing policies, this model may offer a useful approach to a positive optimal tax theory.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.
Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/900199930> # Revisiting the classical view of benefit-based taxation
    a schema:MediaObject, schema:CreativeWork, schema:Book ;
   library:oclcnum "900199930" ;
   library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Topic/income_distribution_government_policy_united_states_econometric_models> ; # Income distribution--Government policy--United States--Econometric models
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Topic/income_tax_social_aspects_united_states_econometric_models> ; # Income tax--Social aspects--United States--Econometric models
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Topic/taxation_united_states_history_econometric_models> ; # Taxation--United States--History--Econometric models
   schema:author <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Person/weinzierl_matthew> ; # Matthew Weinzierl
   schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
   schema:datePublished "2014" ;
   schema:description "This paper explores how the persistently popular "classical" logic of benefit-based taxation, in which an individual's benefit from public goods is tied to his or her income-earning ability, can be incorporated into modern optimal tax theory. If Lindahl's methods are applied to that view of benefits, first-best optimal policy can be characterized analytically as depending on a few potentially estimable statistics, in particular the coefficient of complementarity between public goods and innate talent. Constrained optimal policy with a Pareto-efficient objective that strikes a balance--controlled by a single parameter--between this principle and the familiar utilitarian criterion can be simulated using conventional constraints and methods. A wide range of optimal policy outcomes can result, including those that match well several features of existing policies. To the extent that such an objective reflects the mixed normative reasoning behind prevailing policies, this model may offer a useful approach to a positive optimal tax theory."@en ;
   schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/1878010404> ;
   schema:inLanguage "en" ;
   schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
   schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
   schema:name "Revisiting the classical view of benefit-based taxation"@en ;
   schema:productID "900199930" ;
   schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Organization/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research,
   schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/20735> ;
   schema:url <http://nber.org/papers/w20735> ;
   wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/900199930> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Organization/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research,
    a schema:Organization ;
   schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research," ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Person/weinzierl_matthew> # Matthew Weinzierl
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:familyName "Weinzierl" ;
   schema:givenName "Matthew" ;
   schema:name "Matthew Weinzierl" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
   schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/900199930> ; # Revisiting the classical view of benefit-based taxation
   schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
   schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/900199930> ; # Revisiting the classical view of benefit-based taxation
   schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Topic/income_distribution_government_policy_united_states_econometric_models> # Income distribution--Government policy--United States--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Income distribution--Government policy--United States--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Topic/income_tax_social_aspects_united_states_econometric_models> # Income tax--Social aspects--United States--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Income tax--Social aspects--United States--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1878010404#Topic/taxation_united_states_history_econometric_models> # Taxation--United States--History--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Taxation--United States--History--Econometric models"@en ;
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.