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The role of dynamic renegotiation and asymmetric information in financial contracting

Author: Michael R Roberts; National Bureau of Economic Research,
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 20484.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Using data from SEC filings, I show that the typical bank loan is renegotiated five times, or every nine months. The pricing, maturity, amount, and covenants are all significantly modified during each renegotiation, whose timing is governed by the financial health of the contracting parties and uncertainty regarding the borrowers' credit quality. The relative importance of these factors depends on the duration of  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Michael R Roberts; National Bureau of Economic Research,
OCLC Number: 891966030
Notes: "September 2014"
Description: 1 online resource (43 pages, 15 unnumbered pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 20484.
Responsibility: Michael R. Roberts.

Abstract:

Using data from SEC filings, I show that the typical bank loan is renegotiated five times, or every nine months. The pricing, maturity, amount, and covenants are all significantly modified during each renegotiation, whose timing is governed by the financial health of the contracting parties and uncertainty regarding the borrowers' credit quality. The relative importance of these factors depends on the duration of the lending relationship. I interpret these results in light of financial contracting theories and emphasize that renegotiation is an important mechanism for dynamically completing contracts and for allocating control rights ex post.

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