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|All Authors / Contributors:||
|ISBN:||0415068738 9780415068734 0415094798 9780415094795|
|Description:||vi, 310 pages ; 24 cm.|
|Contents:||Introduction: Economics as social theory --
pt. I. The reason of rules. 1. Rules and choice in economics and sociology. 2. Rational choice vs adaptive rule-following: On the behavioural foundations of the social sciences --
pt. II. Rationality and morality. 3. Morality and economics: De moribus est disputandum. 4. Rational choice and moral order / Victor J. Vanberg and James M. Buchanan --
pt. III. The evolution of rules. 5. Spontaneous market order and social rules: A critical examination of F.A. Hayek's theory of cultural evolution. 6. Hayekian evolutionism --
a reconstruction --
pt. IV. Rules in markets and organizations. 7. Hayek's constitutional political economy. 8. Organizations as constitutional systems. 9. Carl Menger's evolutionary and John R. Commons's collective action approach to institutions: A comparison --
pt. V. Constitutional choice. 10. Interests and theories in constitutional choice / Victor J. Vanberg and James M. Buchanan.
|Series Title:||Economics as social theory.|
|Responsibility:||Viktor J. Vanberg.|
In the place of such a stark opposition, Viktor J. Vanberg offers an analysis which cuts across traditional disciplinary boundaries between such fields as economics, law, moral philosophy, sociology and political science. Addressing such issues as the relationship between self-interest and morality and between evolution and design, his range of reference is equally wide, and Vanberg analyses the contributions of Rawls, Axelrod, Gauthier and Coleman, amongst others. Particular attention is given to a comparison of Hayek's evolutionary liberalism and Buchanan's contractarian liberalism. Taken together, the various parts of the volume represent a coherent theoretical argument about why institutions exist, and why they change.