On October 6, 1973, the high Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, Egyptian troops stormed across the Suez Canal in a startling attack on their bitter Israeli rival, culminating a long period of frustration for the proud Arab nation. Six years earlier, Israel had attacked and won, dealing the Egyptians a territorial loss as well as a psychological blow. In between wars, Egypt had gained a new leader, Anwar Sadat. President Sadat learned to deal with the difficult domestic turmoil surrounding him while pressing for a favorable international response to his problems with his troublesome Israeli neighbor. Eventually, Sadat was left with only one response to gain back what Egyptians had lost in the 1967 War: a surprise military offensive. This paper will show how Sadat's limited military objective of attacking Israel and establishing a bridgehead across the Suez Canal helped achieve his twin political aims of forcing Israel to negotiate the return of occupied Egyptian territory and regaining Egyptian honor.