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Second opinions

Author: Adrian Vermeule; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Publisher: Cambridge, MA : Harvard Law School, [2010]
Series: Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online), no. 673.
Edition/Format:   eBook : English
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
"Abstract: There is a burgeoning literature on second opinions in professional contexts, as when patients or clients seek advice from a second doctor or lawyer. My aim, by contrast, is to analyze second opinions as a central feature of public law. I will try to show that many institutional structures, rules and practices have been justified as mechanisms for requiring or permitting decisionmakers to obtain second  Read more...
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Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource
All Authors / Contributors: Adrian Vermeule; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
OCLC Number: 657271218
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/20/2010.
Details: System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Series Title: Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online), no. 673.
Responsibility: Adrian Vermeule.

Abstract:

"Abstract: There is a burgeoning literature on second opinions in professional contexts, as when patients or clients seek advice from a second doctor or lawyer. My aim, by contrast, is to analyze second opinions as a central feature of public law. I will try to show that many institutional structures, rules and practices have been justified as mechanisms for requiring or permitting decisionmakers to obtain second opinions; examples include judicial review of statutes or of agency action, bicameralism, the separation of powers, and the law of legislative procedure. I attempt to identify the main costs and benefits of these second-opinion mechanisms, to identify conditions under which they prove more or less successful, and to consider how the lawmaking system might employ such mechanisms to greater effect. I claim, among other things, that Alexander Bickel's justification of judicial review as a "sober second thought" is untenable, and that the Supreme Court should adopt a norm that two successive decisions, not merely one, are necessary to create binding law"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.

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