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Seeking alpha : excess risk taking and competition for managerial talent

Author: Viral V Acharya; Marco Pagano; Paolo Volpin; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2013.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 18891.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co-insurance among employees. In anticipation, risk-averse managers  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Viral V Acharya; Marco Pagano; Paolo Volpin; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 830319963
Notes: Title from http://www.nber.org/papers/18891 viewed March 18, 2013.
"March 2013."
Description: 1 online resource (47 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 18891.
Responsibility: Viral V. Acharya, Marco Pagano, Paolo Volpin.

Abstract:

We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co-insurance among employees. In anticipation, risk-averse managers may churn across firms or undertake aggregate risks in order to delay the revelation of their true quality. The result is excessive risk-taking with pay for short-term performance and an accumulation of long-term risks. We conclude with a discussion of policies to address the inefficiency in compensation.

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