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Selection and Improvement : Physician Responses to Financial Incentives

Author: Nancy Beaulieu; Jason R Barro; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. w10017.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
In this study we examine the effects of transferring physicians from a compensation system based on salary to a profit-sharing system. Consistent with theory, we find that the change has a large and significant effect on the quantity of services provided. In addition, we find a selection effect, where the least productive doctors leave the company and more productive doctors join.
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Nancy Beaulieu; Jason R Barro; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 756563799
Description: 1 online resource.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. w10017.
Responsibility: Jason Barro, Nancy Beaulieu.

Abstract:

In this study we examine the effects of transferring physicians from a compensation system based on salary to a profit-sharing system. Consistent with theory, we find that the change has a large and significant effect on the quantity of services provided. In addition, we find a selection effect, where the least productive doctors leave the company and more productive doctors join.

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