skip to content
Smooth politicians and paternalistic voters : a theory of large elections Preview this item
ClosePreview this item
Checking...

Smooth politicians and paternalistic voters : a theory of large elections

Author: Marco Faravelli; Randall P Walsh; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2011.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 17397.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
We propose a new game theoretic approach to modeling large elections that overcomes the "paradox of voting" in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of ad hoc preferences for voting. The key innovation that we propose is the adoption of a "smooth" policy rule under which the degree to which parties favor their own interests is increasing in their margin of victory. In other words, mandates  Read more...
Rating:

(not yet rated) 0 with reviews - Be the first.

Subjects
More like this

Find a copy online

Links to this item

Find a copy in the library

&AllPage.SpinnerRetrieving; Finding libraries that hold this item...

Details

Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Faravelli, Marco.
Smooth politicians and paternalistic voters.
Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2011
(DLC) 2011657338
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Marco Faravelli; Randall P Walsh; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 749885626
Description: 1 online resource (42 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 17397.
Responsibility: Marco Faravelli, Randall Walsh.

Abstract:

We propose a new game theoretic approach to modeling large elections that overcomes the "paradox of voting" in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of ad hoc preferences for voting. The key innovation that we propose is the adoption of a "smooth" policy rule under which the degree to which parties favor their own interests is increasing in their margin of victory. In other words, mandates matter. We argue that this approach is an improvement over the existing literature as it is consistent with the empirical evidence. Incorporating this policy rule into a costly voting model with paternalistic voters yields a parsimonious model with attractive properties. Specifically, the model predicts that when the size of the electorate grows without bound, limiting turnout is strictly positive both in terms of numbers and proportions. Further, the model preserves the typical comparative statics predictions that have been identified in the extant costly voting models such as the underdog effect and the competition effect. Finally, under the case of selfish agents, we are able to extend Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1985) zero turnout result to a general class of smooth policy rules. Thus, this new approach reconciles the predictions of standard costly voting, both in terms of positive turnout and comparative statics predictions with the assumption of a large electorate environment.

Reviews

User-contributed reviews
Retrieving GoodReads reviews...
Retrieving DOGObooks reviews...

Tags

Be the first.

Similar Items

Related Subjects:(1)

Confirm this request

You may have already requested this item. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway.

Linked Data


Primary Entity

<http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/749885626> # Smooth politicians and paternalistic voters : a theory of large elections
    a schema:Book, schema:MediaObject, schema:CreativeWork ;
   library:oclcnum "749885626" ;
   library:placeOfPublication <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1007422142#Place/cambridge_mass> ; # Cambridge, Mass.
   library:placeOfPublication <http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/countries/mau> ;
   schema:about <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1007422142#Topic/elections_econometric_models> ; # Elections--Econometric models
   schema:about <http://id.worldcat.org/fast/904341> ; # Elections--Econometric models
   schema:about <http://dewey.info/class/330/> ;
   schema:bookFormat schema:EBook ;
   schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/2160395> ; # Randall P. Walsh
   schema:contributor <http://viaf.org/viaf/135446122> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research.
   schema:copyrightYear "2011" ;
   schema:creator <http://viaf.org/viaf/53958581> ; # Marco Faravelli
   schema:datePublished "2011" ;
   schema:description "We propose a new game theoretic approach to modeling large elections that overcomes the "paradox of voting" in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of ad hoc preferences for voting. The key innovation that we propose is the adoption of a "smooth" policy rule under which the degree to which parties favor their own interests is increasing in their margin of victory. In other words, mandates matter. We argue that this approach is an improvement over the existing literature as it is consistent with the empirical evidence. Incorporating this policy rule into a costly voting model with paternalistic voters yields a parsimonious model with attractive properties. Specifically, the model predicts that when the size of the electorate grows without bound, limiting turnout is strictly positive both in terms of numbers and proportions. Further, the model preserves the typical comparative statics predictions that have been identified in the extant costly voting models such as the underdog effect and the competition effect. Finally, under the case of selfish agents, we are able to extend Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1985) zero turnout result to a general class of smooth policy rules. Thus, this new approach reconciles the predictions of standard costly voting, both in terms of positive turnout and comparative statics predictions with the assumption of a large electorate environment."@en ;
   schema:exampleOfWork <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/1007422142> ;
   schema:inLanguage "en" ;
   schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1007422142#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
   schema:isPartOf <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1007422142#Series/nber_working_paper_series> ; # NBER working paper series ;
   schema:isSimilarTo <http://worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1007422142#CreativeWork/smooth_politicians_and_paternalistic_voters> ;
   schema:name "Smooth politicians and paternalistic voters : a theory of large elections"@en ;
   schema:productID "749885626" ;
   schema:publication <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/749885626#PublicationEvent/cambridge_mass_national_bureau_of_economic_research_2011> ;
   schema:publisher <http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1007422142#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> ; # National Bureau of Economic Research
   schema:url <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w17397> ;
   schema:url <http://ezproxy.eui.eu/login?url=http://papers.nber.org/papers/> ;
   wdrs:describedby <http://www.worldcat.org/title/-/oclc/749885626> ;
    .


Related Entities

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1007422142#Agent/national_bureau_of_economic_research> # National Bureau of Economic Research
    a bgn:Agent ;
   schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1007422142#Place/cambridge_mass> # Cambridge, Mass.
    a schema:Place ;
   schema:name "Cambridge, Mass." ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1007422142#Series/nber_working_paper_series> # NBER working paper series ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
   schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/749885626> ; # Smooth politicians and paternalistic voters : a theory of large elections
   schema:name "NBER working paper series ;" ;
    .

<http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1007422142#Series/working_paper_series_national_bureau_of_economic_research> # Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
    a bgn:PublicationSeries ;
   schema:hasPart <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/749885626> ; # Smooth politicians and paternalistic voters : a theory of large elections
   schema:name "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;" ;
    .

<http://id.worldcat.org/fast/904341> # Elections--Econometric models
    a schema:Intangible ;
   schema:name "Elections--Econometric models"@en ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/135446122> # National Bureau of Economic Research.
    a schema:Organization ;
   schema:name "National Bureau of Economic Research." ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/2160395> # Randall P. Walsh
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:birthDate "1963" ;
   schema:familyName "Walsh" ;
   schema:givenName "Randall P." ;
   schema:name "Randall P. Walsh" ;
    .

<http://viaf.org/viaf/53958581> # Marco Faravelli
    a schema:Person ;
   schema:familyName "Faravelli" ;
   schema:givenName "Marco" ;
   schema:name "Marco Faravelli" ;
    .

<http://worldcat.org/entity/work/data/1007422142#CreativeWork/smooth_politicians_and_paternalistic_voters>
    a schema:CreativeWork ;
   rdfs:label "Smooth politicians and paternalistic voters." ;
   schema:description "Print version:" ;
   schema:isSimilarTo <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/749885626> ; # Smooth politicians and paternalistic voters : a theory of large elections
    .


Content-negotiable representations

Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.