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Storable votes and judicial nominations in the U.S. Senate

Author: Alessandra Casella; Sebastien Turban; Gregory J Wawro; National Bureau of Economic Research,
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 20461.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
We model a procedural reform aimed at restoring a proper role for the minority in the confirmation process of judicial nominations in the U.S. Senate. We analyze a proposal that would call for nominations to the same level court to be collected in periodic lists and voted upon individually with Storable Votes, allowing each senator to allocate freely a fixed number of total votes. Although each nomination is decided  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Alessandra Casella; Sebastien Turban; Gregory J Wawro; National Bureau of Economic Research,
OCLC Number: 892630291
Notes: "September 2014"
Includes online appendix (1 PDF file (9 pages), 1 zip file).
Description: 1 online resource (26 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 20461.
Responsibility: Alessandra Casella, Sébastien Turban, Gregory J. Wawro.

Abstract:

We model a procedural reform aimed at restoring a proper role for the minority in the confirmation process of judicial nominations in the U.S. Senate. We analyze a proposal that would call for nominations to the same level court to be collected in periodic lists and voted upon individually with Storable Votes, allowing each senator to allocate freely a fixed number of total votes. Although each nomination is decided by simple majority, storable votes make it possible for the minority to win occasionally, but only when the relative importance its members assign to a nomination is higher than the relative importance assigned by the majority. Numerical simulations, motivated by a game theoretic model, show that under plausible assumptions a minority of 45 senators would be able to block between 20 and 35 percent of nominees. For most parameter values, the possibility of minority victories increases aggregate welfare.

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