The China-Burma-India (CBI) theater, perhaps the most political front in World War II, has been largely ignored by students of military history. One reason for this inattention is the bitter interservice as well as interallied friction that nearly led to a collapse of cooperation between Great Britain and the United States in the southeast Asian theater of operations. The squabbles were over the best strategy for defeating Japan, the command and control of forces and resources in theater, postwar decolonization, and U.S. policy toward China. Finally, CBI was a backwater, receiving little in the way of men and equipment despite the extent of the front and the number of Japanese on the Asian mainland. Only through the dogged determination of those who fought there, and the belated importance attached to CBI after the Trident conference of May 1943, was the theater given resources for a three-pronged offensive aimed at removing the Japanese threat to British-controlled India as well as driving them from Burma, China, and Indochina.