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Sustainable shadow banking

Author: Guillermo L Ordoñez; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 19022.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Commercial banks are subject to regulation that restricts their investments. When banks are concerned for their reputation, however, they could self-regulate and invest more efficiently. Hence, a shadow banking that arises to avoid regulation has the potential to improve welfare. Still, reputation concerns depend on future economic prospects and may suddenly disappear, generating a collapse of shadow banking and a  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Guillermo L Ordoñez; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 842241111
Notes: Title from http://www.nber.org/papers/19022 viewed May 9, 2013.
"May 2013."
Description: 1 online resource (37 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 19022.
Responsibility: Guillermo Ordonez.

Abstract:

Commercial banks are subject to regulation that restricts their investments. When banks are concerned for their reputation, however, they could self-regulate and invest more efficiently. Hence, a shadow banking that arises to avoid regulation has the potential to improve welfare. Still, reputation concerns depend on future economic prospects and may suddenly disappear, generating a collapse of shadow banking and a return to traditional banking, with a decline in welfare. I discuss how a combination of traditional regulation and cross reputation subsidization may enhance shadow banking and make it more sustainable.

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