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Systemic Risk and Optimal Regulatory Architecture.

Author: Marco A Espinosa-Vega; Rafael Matta; Charles M Kahn; Juan Sole
Publisher: Washington : International Monetary Fund, 2011.
Series: IMF Working Papers.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Until the recent financial crisis, the safety and soundness of financial institutions was assessed from the perspective of the individual institution. The financial crisis highlighted the need to take systemic externalities seriously when rethinking prudential oversight and the regulatory architecture. Current financial reform legislation worldwide reflects this intent. However, these reforms have overlooked the  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Espinosa-Vega, Marco A.
Systemic Risk and Optimal Regulatory Architecture.
Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2011
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Marco A Espinosa-Vega; Rafael Matta; Charles M Kahn; Juan Sole
ISBN: 9781463900984 1463900988
OCLC Number: 867927570
Description: 1 online resource (45 pages).
Contents: Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model without Private Information; Figure 1; A. Regulatory Architectures: Unified vs Multiple Regulators; B. Equilibrium in a Multi-Regulator Architecture; Figure 2; Figure 3; C. Equilibrium in a Unified Regulator Architecture; 1. Non-systemic bank; Figure 4; 2. Systemic bank; Figure 5; D. Comparing Multiple- vs Unified-Regulator Architectures; 1. Non-Systemic bank; 2. Systemic bank; Table 1; III. The Model with Private Information; A. Information Sharing; 1. The DI has incentive to act strategically. 2. Communication is innefectiveFigure 6; B. Information Gathering; IV. Concluding Remarks; References; Footnotes.
Series Title: IMF Working Papers.

Abstract:

Until the recent financial crisis, the safety and soundness of financial institutions was assessed from the perspective of the individual institution. The financial crisis highlighted the need to take systemic externalities seriously when rethinking prudential oversight and the regulatory architecture. Current financial reform legislation worldwide reflects this intent. However, these reforms have overlooked the need to also consider regulatory agencies' forbearance and information sharing incentives. In a political economy model that explicitly accounts for systemic connectedness, and regulat.

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